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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CASSIA COUNTY

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC,
Limited Liability Company,

a

Plaintiff-Appellant,

Texas

Supreme Court Case No. 46595-2018
District Court No. CV-2017-0290

Vs.
ALLAN WARD,
Defendant-Respondent.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, in
and for the County of Cassia.
Before HONORABLE MICHAEL P. TRIBE, a District Judge.

For Appellant:

Kimberly L. Williams
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LARSEN, LLP
153 East Main Street
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, ID 83338
klwilliams@wmlattys.com

For Respondent:

David T. Krueck
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1359
Boise, ID 83701
dtk@elamburke.com
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CASSIA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-290
Primera Beef, LLC A Texas Limited Liability Comp
vs.
Allan Ward

§
§
§

§
§

Location:
Judicial Officer:
Filed on:
Case Number History:
Appellate Case Number:

Cassia County District Court
Tribe, Michael P.
03/13/2017
46595-2018

CASE INFORMATION

Bonds
Cash Bond
12/4/2018
Counts: 1

AA- All Initial District Court
Case Type: Filings (Not E, F, and Hl)

$103.00
Posted Cash

Case 12/05/2018 Appealed Case Status: Supreme Court Appeal

DATE

CASE ASSIGNI\lENT

Current Case Assignment
Case Number
Court
Date Assigned
Judicial Officer

CV-2017-290
Cassia County District Court
07/28/2017
Tribe, Michael P.

PARTY INFORMATION

Plaintiff

Primera Beef, LLC A Texas Limited Liability Comp

Defendant

Ward,Allan

DATE

Lead Attorneys
Williams, Kimberly Lynette
Retained
208-324-2303(W)
Krueck, David Thomas
Retained
208-343-5454(W)

EVENTS

& ORDERS OF THE COURT

03/13/2017

New Case Filed Other Claims
New Case Filed - Other Claims

03/13/2017

Miscellaneous
Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings

03/13/2017

Complaint Filed
Complaint Filed

03/13/2017

Summons Issued
Summons Issued-mailed to Pl Atty.

04/10/2017

Affidavit of Service
Affidavit ofService: Allan Ward served on 3/2812017

04/14/2017

Miscellaneous
Filing: /1 - Initial Appearance

04/14/2017

Notice of Appearance
Defendant: Ward, Allan Notice OfAppearance R Keith Roark

04/21/2017

Notice of Intent to Take Default
Notice Of Intent To Take Default pursuant to IRCP 55(a)(J)

04/24/2017

Answer
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CASSIA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMAR Y
CASE No. CV-2017-290
Answer and Counter-Claim
04/24/2017

Order
Order Regarding Trial Scheduling

04/25/2017

Response
Defendant's Response to Order Regarding Trial Scheduling

04/27/2017

Response
Plaintiffs Response to Order Regarding Scheduling Order

04/28/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 02/12/2018 08:45 AM)

04/28/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 03/20/2018 08:30 AM)

04/28/2017

Scheduling Order, Notice of Trial Setting and Pretrial Order
Scheduling Order, Notice a/Trial Setting and Initial Pretrial Order
(Stipulation/or Scheduling & Planning)

04/28/2017

Order
Order Regarding Jury Selection Procedure-Civil Case (Struck Jury)

05/03/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06/06/2017 08:30 AM) Motion to Dismiss

05/12/2017

Motion
Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss Defendants Counterclaim/or Failure to State a Claim upon
which Reliefcan be Granted

05/12/2017

Motion
Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs Motion to Dismiss

05/12/2017

Notice of Hearing
Notice ofHearing on Plaintiffs Motion to Dismiss

05/12/2017

Motion
Motion/or Leave to Appear Via Telephone

06/06/2017

Court Minutes
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion to Dismiss
Hearing date: 6/6/2017
Time: 8:31 am
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson
Tape Number:
Party: Allan Ward, Attorney: R Roark
Party: Primera Beef, LLC A Texas Limited Liability Comp, Attorney: Kimberly Williams

06/06/2017

Hearing Held
Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 06/06/2017 08:30 AM: Hearing Held Motion to
Dismiss

06/06/2017

Order
Order Denying Dismissal ofCounterclaim

06/06/2017

Motion Hearing (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Crabtree, Michael R.)
Motion to Dismiss Hearing result/or Motion scheduled on 06/06/2017 08:30 AM: Hearing
Held
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CASSIA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-290
06/12/2017

Answer
Answer to Counterclaim

06/23/2017

Notice of Service of Discovery Requests
Notice OfService Of Discovery

06/28/2017

Hearing Scheduled
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 08/01/2017 04:00 PM) Motion to Disqualify Defendant's Counsel

07/17/2017

Motion
Motion to Disqualify Defendants Counsel Pursuant to Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 3. 7

07/17/2017

Notice of Hearing
Notice ofHearing

07/17/2017

Memorandum
in Support ofMotion to Disqualify Defendants Counsel Pursuant to Idaho Rule of
Professional Conduct 3. 7

07/26/2017

Continued
Continued (Motion 08/15/2017 04: 30 PM) Motion to Disqualify Defendant's Counsel

07/26/2017

Notice of Hearing
Amended Notice Of Hearing

08/08/2017

Motion
Motion for Leave to Appear via TCC

08/09/2017

Order
Granting Leave to Appear via telephone

08/15/2017

Hearing Held
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 08/15/2017 04:30 PM: Hearing Held TCC: Motion to
Disqualify Defendant's Counsel

08/15/2017

Court Minutes
Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion to Disqualify Defendant's Counsel
Hearing date: 811512017
Time: 4:30 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Tara Gunderson
Tape Number:
Party: Allan Ward, Attorney: R Roark
Party: Primera Beef. LLC A Texas Limited Liability Comp, Attorney: Kimberly Williams

08/15/2017

Motion Hearing (4:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Tribe, Michael P.)
TCC: Motion to Disqualify Defendant's Counsel Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
08/15/2017 04:30 PM: Hearing Held

08/15/2017

Order
DENYING Motion to Disqualify Counsel

1()/(),;f?/ll 7

•

10/06/2017

9Affidavit

Motion to Withdraw
Motion/or Leave to Withdraw

Affidavit ofR. Keith Roark in Support of Motion for Leave to Withdraw
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CASSIA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE NO. CV-2017-290
10/12/2017

.Notice
ofNon-Opposition to Motion/or Leave to Withdraw

11/09/2017

.Motion
for Leave to Appear Via Telephone

11/09/2017

•

11/13/2017

.Order
Granting Leave to Appear Via Telephone

11/16/2017

.Motion
to File Under Seal

11/16/2017

•

Declaration
ofKimberly L. Williams

11/16/2017

•

Motion to Shorten Time
(Plaintiffs)

11/16/2017

.Order
to Shorten Time

11/17/2017

Notice of Hearing

• Motion to Withdraw as Attorney (1:15 PM) (Judicial Officer: Tribe, Michael
P. ;Location: Courtroom 1)
Plaintiffs Motion to File Under Seal

11/17/2017

•

11/17/2017

.Order
to File Under Seal

11/27/2017

•

11/27/2017

Order Granting Leave to Withdraw as Atty of Record

Court Minutes

Miscellaneous
Confidential Document filed Under Seal
(in physical file)

12/01/2017

•

Notice of Appearance
Notice ofAppearance

01/10/2018

•

Stipulation
to Vacate and Reset Trial Date

01/15/2018

.Order
Vacating Trial Setting

01/30/2018

.Notice
of Telephonic Status Conference

02/12/2018

CANCELED Pre-trial Conference (8:45 AM) (Judicial Officer: Conversion,
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Page 5

Printed on 01/31/2019 at 1:52 PM

CASSIA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMAR Y
CASE No. CV-2017-290
Unknown ;Location: Courtroom 1)
Vacated

02/20/2018

• Scheduling Conference (l: 15 PM) (Judicial Officer: Tribe, Michael
P. ;Location: Courtroom l)
via TCC

02/20/2018

•

02/23/2018

•

Notice of Service
of Discovery Responses

02/26/2018

•

Notice of Hearing
Pretrial Conference & Jury Trial

02/27/2018

.Amended
Notice ofHearing- PTC & Jury Trial

02/28/2018

•

03/20/2018

Court Minutes

Notice of Service of Discovery Requests
Notice o/Service

CANCELED Jury Trial (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Tribe, Michael P. ;Location: Courtroom 1)
Vacated

03/29/2018

•

Notice of Service
ofPlaintiff's Response to Defendant's First Set ofInterrogatories and Requests for Production
ofDocuments

05/03/2018

•

Motion for Summary Judgment
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

05/03/2018

•

Memorandum In Support of Motion
Memorandum in Support ofDefendant's Motion/or Summary Judgment

05/03/2018

II Declaration
ofAllan Ward in Support ofDefendant's Motion/or Summary Judgment

05/03/2018

•

05/03/2018

•

05/04/2018

•

Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff's Motion/or Summary Judgment

05/04/2018

•

Memorandum In Support of Motion
Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment

05/04/2018

•

Declaration
Declaration ofKimberly L. Williams in Support ofPlaintiff's MSJ

05/04/2018

.Notice of Hearing

Declaration
ofDavid T. Krueck in Support ofDefendant's Motion/or Summary Judgment
Notice of Hearing
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CASSIA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-290
05/04/2018

.Motion
Motion to Seal the Declaration ofAllan Ward in Support of Defendant's Motion/or Summary
Judgment

05/04/2018

.Order
Order to Seal the Declaration ofAllan Ward in Support ofDefendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment

05/15/2018

•

Notice of Service
Notice ofService of Paintiff's First Supplemental Response to Defendant's First set of
Interrogatories and Requests for Production ofDocuments

05/17/2018

•

Stipulation
for Dismissal of Counterclaim With Prejudice

05/17/2018

•

Memorandum
Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

05/17/2018

.Affidavit
of Gary D. Slette in Opposition to Defendant's Motion/or Summary Judgment

05/17/2018

•

05/21/2018

.Order
For Dismissal of Counterclaim With Prejudice

05/24/2018

.Reply
Memorandum in Support ofDefendant's Motion/or Summary Judgment

06/01/2018

Declaration
ofDustin Dean in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

• Summary Judgment (3:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Tribe, Michael
P. ;Location: Courtroom l)
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
Plaintiff's Motion/or Summary Judgment

06/01/2018

•

07/03/2018

•

Notice of Substitution of Counsel
Notice ofSubstitution of Counsel

07/20/2018

•

Memorandum
Memorandum Decision Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment

08/01/2018

.Motion
Defendant's Motion/or Attorney's Fees

08/01/2018

•

08/01/2018

.Affidavit
ofDavid T. Krueck in Support ofDefendant's Motion/or Attorney's Fees

Court Minutes

Memorandum In Support of Motion
Memorandum in Support ofDefendant's Motion/or Attorney's Fees
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CASSIA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-290
08/07/2018

CANCELED Pre-trial Conference (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Tribe, Michael
P. ;Location: Courtroom 1)
Vacated
TCC

08/21/2018

.Motion
to Postpone Hearing on Defendant's Motion for Attorney's Fees Pending Plaintiff's Motion/or
Reconsideration

08/21/2018

•

Motion for Reconsideration
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration

08/21/2018

•

Memorandum In Support of Motion
Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration

08/27/2018

.Notice of Hearing

08/27/2018

.Amended
Amended Notice ofHearing

08/30/2018

.Notice
ofIntent to Appear Telephonically

09/05/2018

• CANCELED Jury Trial (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Tribe, Michael
P. ;Location: Courtroom 1)
Vacated

09/05/2018

•

Memorandum
in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration

09/10/2018

•

Memorandum
Reply Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration

09/12/2018

• Motion for Reconsideration (4:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Tribe, Michael
P. ;Location: Courtroom 1)
Defendant to Appear by Phone
09/10/2018
Continued to 09/12/2018- Cont- Other-Primera Beef. LLC A Texas
Limited Liability Comp

09/12/2018

•

09/13/2018

•

09/14/2018

.Amended
Memorandum ofAttorney's Fees

10/24/2018

.Order
Order Awarding Attorney's Fees

10/24/2018

.Judgment

Court Minutes
Memorandum
Decision Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration
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CASSIA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-290
10/24/2018

Final Judgment (Judicial Officer: Tribe, Michael P.)
Party (Primera Beef, LLC A Texas Limited Liability Comp; Ward, Allan)
Monetary/Property Award
In Favor Of: Ward, Allan
Against: Primera Beef, LLC A Texas Limited Liability Comp
Entered Date: 10/24/2018
Current Judgment Status:
Status: Active
Status Date: 10/24/2018
Monetary Award:
Amount: $11,249.00

10/24/2018

Civil Disposition Entered

12/04/2018

•

Bond Posted - Cash
Estimate a/Clerk's Record on Appeal

12/04/2018

•

Appeal Filed in Supreme Court
Notice ofAppeal

12/06/2018

IJ Case Summary

12/19/2018

.Order
Order Conditionally Dismissing Appeal

12/19/2018

•

Transcript Lodged
TRANSCRIPT - Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment held on 06/01/2018

12/19/2018

•

Transcript Lodged
TRANSCRIPT - Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration held on 09/12/2018

12/19/2018

.Notice
Notice ofLodging (Transcripts - MSJ 06/01/2018 & Motion for Reconsideration 09/12/2018)

12/27/2018

•

12/31/2018

.Order
Order Withdawing Conditional Dismissal

12/31/2018

.Amended
Notice ofAppeal

01/03/2019

.Notice
Clerks Record and Reporters Transcripts Due Date Set

Amended Judgment

DATE

F'INANCIAL l.NFORi'VIATION

Defendant Ward, Allan
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 1/31/2019

136.00
136.00
0.00

Plaintiff Primera Beef, LLC A Texas Limited Liability Comp
Total Charges
Total Payments and Credits
Balance Due as of 1/31/2019

350.00
350.00
0.00
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CASSIA COUNTY DISTRICT COURT

CASE SUMMARY
CASE No. CV-2017-290
Attorney of Record Williams, Kimberly Lynette
Civil Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 1/31/2019
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Filed: 12/20/2018
12/19/20108 09:14:14
at 4:46 p.m.
Fifth Judicial District, Cassia County
Joseph W Larsen, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Gunderson, Tara

PATRICIA E. HUBBELL, CSR
Official Court Reporter
Fifth Judicial District
Cassia County Judicial Center
1559 Overland Avenue
Burley, Idaho 83318
(208)878-9503
phubbell@cassiacounty.org
*****************************************************************

NOTICE OF LODGING
*****************************************************************

DATE:
TO:

December 19, 2018
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk of the Court
Supreme Court/ Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO:

46595-2018

DISTRICT COURT CASE NO: CV2017-290
CAPTION OF CASE:

PRIMERA BEEF V. ALLAN WARD

You are hereby notified that a reporter's appellate transcript in
the above-entitled and numbered case has been lodged with the
District Court Clerk of the County of Cassia in the Fifth
Judicial District.
Said transcript consists of the following
proceedings, totaling 41 pages:
6/1/18
9/12/18

(19 pages - motion for summary judgment)
(22 pages - motion for reconsideration)
Respectfully,

PATRICIA E. HUBBELL
Idaho CSR #1047
cc:

District Court Clerk

Page 11
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE 5th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO
Flied By: N. A ~
On: 3/13/201710:30 AM

JOSEPH W. LARSEN
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS

IDAHO STATE BAR NO. 8893
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP
Attorneys at Law
153 East Main Street
P. 0. Box 168
Jerome, Idaho 83338
Telephone: (208) 324-2303
Facsimile: (208) 324-3135
klwilliams@wmlattys.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,
--...
.
Plaintiff,
vs

Case No. CV- J___a \ 'l_. ~9D

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL

ALLAN WARD, an individual,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the above-named Plaintiff, by and through its counsel of record,
the law firm of WILLIAMS MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP, and for a cause of action
against the Defendant, COMPLAINS AND ALLEGES as follows:
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 1
Page 12

•

•

PARTIES, JURISDICTION, AND VENUE

1.

Plaintiff Primera Beef, LLC ("Plaintiff' or "Primera"), at all times relevant

herein was a Texas limited liability company conducting business in the State ofldaho.
2.

Defendant Allan Ward ("Defendant" or "Ward") at all times relevant herein

has been, and presently is, a resident of Cassia County, Idaho
3.

The Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Idaho Code § 1-705.

4.

Venue is proper, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 5-404 because Defendant resides in

Cassia County and the acts and omissions herein complained of occurred in Cassia County.
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS

5

On or about October 3, 2016 Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against Ward and a

related party, that lawsuit is identified as Cassia County Case No. CV 2016-859.
6.

On or about November 10, 2016 Primera and Ward entered into a binding

agreement ("Settlement Agreement") settling the matters at issue in Cassia County Case No. CV
2016-859.
7.

The Settlement Agreement included an express provision requiring all parties

thereto keep the terms of the Settlement Agreement strictly confidential and affixing liquidated
damages for the breach of that provision.
8.

On or about January 9, 2017 Ward through his agent, Keith Roark, Esq.,

disclosed in detail terms of the Settlement Agreement in written correspondence to Mr. McCord
Larsen, Esq.
9.

The Settlement Agreement also contains a provision for legal fees and costs in

the event of a breach of the Settlement Agreement.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 2
Page 13

•
COUNT ONE
Breach of Contract

10.

Plaintiff hereby realleges the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1 through

9 as set forth above, and incorporates the same herein by reference.
11.

Ward breached the Settlement Agreement by his agent's disclosure of the

material terms of the Settlement Agreement in violation of the confidentiality provision.
12.

Plaintiff has suffered damages as a result of Ward's breach of the

confidentiality provision of the Settlement Agreement and seeks as damages the contractually agreed
upon liquidated damages amount identified in the Settlement Agreement.
13

Plaintiff is entitled to recover its attorneys' fees and costs incurred in pursuing

this matter pursuant the terms of the Settlement Agreement and pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120
and 12-121.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs pray for Judgment, Order and Decree of this Court as
follows:
1.

For judgment of the court awarding Plaintiff damages in excess of $10,000.00,

incurred as a result of Defendant's breach of contract.
2.

For prejudgment interest on all damages recovered at the rate set forth within

Idaho Code§ 28-22-104.
3.

For Plaintiffs reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in prosecuting this

action, pursuant to Idaho Code §§ 12-120 and 12-121 and in accordance with the Settlement
Agreement.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 3
Page 14

•

•

4.

For s.uch_other_aridfurther relief as court deems just and necessary.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury of no less than twelve (12) persons on all issues so
triable pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b ).
th
DATED this 9 day of March, 2017.

WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP

JL

By_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Kimberly L. Williams
Attorneys for Plaintiff
\\OFFICESERVER\KLW\Clients\Primera Beef\Pleadings\Complaint.doc

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL - 4
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1

•

•

FAX No. 2087883918

Roark Law Firm

3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE STH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO
ON: 4/24/201711:00 AM

JOSEPH LARSEN
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
FILED BY: JB

R. KEITH ROARK, ISBN 2230

THE ROARK LAW FIRM, LLP

2

P. 001/010

515 S. 1st Avenue
Hailey, Idaho 83333
TEL: 208/788-2427
FA.X: 208/788-3918

4
Attorne ys for Defendsnt
5

IN THE DISTR ICT COUR T OF THE FIFTH JUDIC IAL DISTR ICT OF
THE
STATE OF IDAHO , IN AND FOR THE COUN TY OF CASSI A

6
7

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas
limited liability company

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

8

Plaintiff,
9
vs.
1A

lV

ALLAN WARD, an individual,
11

Defendant.
12

CaseNo. CV-2017-290
ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM

13
COME S NOW THE DEFEN DANT in the above entitled action and does hereby

14

15

16

ANSW ER the COMP LAINT against him in the above referenced case as follows
. All

avennents of the Complaint not specifically admitted herein are denied.
Defend ant is without lmowle dge or information sufficient to admit or deny this

17

1.

18

averme nt and, therefore, DENIE S this avennent.

19

2.

ADMIT TED.

20

3.

ADMIT TED.

21

4.

ADMIT TED.

22

5.

ADMIT TED.

23

6.

ADMIT TED.

.

24
ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM

1

THE ROARK LAW FIRM
409 No1th Main Street
Hailey, Idaho 83333
(208) 788 2427 Fax (208) 788-3918

Page 16
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FAX No. 20878831

P. 002/0 l0

1

7.

ADMIT TED.

2

8.

Defendant DENIES that R. Keith Roark was acting as his agent in regard to
the civil

3

case upon which PLAIN TIFF' complaint is based and further denies that
he had any

4

knowledge of Mr. Roark' s contacts with Mr. Larsen or authorized the same.

5

9.

ADMIT TED.

6

10.

All re-plead paragraphs of Plainti ff COMP LAINT are re-answered as set forth

7

above.

8

11.

DENIED.

9

12.

DENIED.

10

13.

DENIED.

11

AFFfilMATIVE DEFENSES
12

FIRST DEFENSE
13

(Failure to state claim or cause of action)

14

As and for a first affinnative defense, the defendant alleges that the complaint

15

herein fails to sufficiently constitute a cause of action against the answering defenda
nt or fails to

16

state facts upon which a claim can be based.

17

SECOND DEFENSE
(Damages claimed attributable to others)

18
2.
19
20

21

As and for a second separate affirmative defense, the defendant alleges that the

damages suffered by plaintiff, if any, were the result of the acts or omissions
of other parties,
named and unnamed in this action, for which the answering defendant bear no
responsibility.

22

THIRD DEFENSE
(Breach of contract by plaintiff)

23

3.
24

As and for a third separate affirmative defense, the defendant alleges that to the

ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM

2

THE ROARK LAW FIRM
409 No1th Main Stl'eet
Hailey, Idaho 83333
(208) 188 2427 Fax (20&) 788-3918

Page 17
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•

Roark Law Firm

FAX No. 20878 83.

P. 003/010

1

extent plaintiff seek recovery in contract, plaintiff materially breached the terms and condition
s

2

of said agreement and are entitled to no relief thereon.

3

FOURT H DEFEN SE
(Da:mages caused by negligence of plaintiff)

4

4.
5
6

As and for a fourth separate affirmative defense, the defendant alleges that the

damages suffered by plaintiff, if any, were the result of tl1e negligence and failure
to use
reasonable diligence in performing the acts requited of plaintiff.

7

FIFTH DEFEN SE
(Contributory negligen ce by plaintiff)

8

9

5.

As and for a fifth separate affirmative defense, the defendant alleges the plaintiff

10

was guilty of contributory fault and negligence in the matters allegesd in the complaint and that

11

such contributory fault and negligence proximately caused the damages complained ofherein
.

12

SIXTH DEFENSE
(Estoppel)

13
6.

As and for a sixth separate affirmative defense, the defendant alleges that

14

15
16

plaintiff's conduct, including, but not limited to, their failm·e to notify the defendant
of the
occurrences complained of, operated as estoppel and waiver of any rights to file the
action
herein.

17

SEVEN TH DEFENSE
(Failu:re to co:mply with conditio ns p:recedent)

18
19

7.

As and for a seventh separate affirmative defense, the defendant alleges plaintiff

20

failed and refused to comply with the conh-actual conditions precedent to this action, including

21

but not limited to, timely written notice and detailed statements for the amounts claimed,

22

thereby extinguishing the right to maintain the action herein.

23

EIGHT H DEFEN SE
(Claim barred by unclean hands)

24
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1
9.

2

As and for an eighth separate affirmative defense, the defendant alleges that

plaintiff s action is barred under the equitable doctrine of unclean hands.
3

NINTH DEFENSE
4

5

(Full performance by defendant)
10.

As and for a ninth separate affirmative defense, the defendant alleges that he

6

perfonn ed all of the actions required of him under the subject agreement and that the
only

7

additional action required to cany out the agreement was performance by others.

8

TENTH DEFENSE
(Recovery reduced or eliminated by failure to mitigate)

9

13.

11

As and for a tenth separate affirmative defense, the defendant alleges that any

recovery by plaintiff is bruTed by their failure to mitigate damages, or that any recovery must
be
reduced by those damages that plaintiff failed to mitigate.

12

ELEVENTH DEFENSE
13

14

15

(No reasonable reliance)
16.

As and for a eleventh separate affirmative defense, the defendant alleges that any

recovery by plaintiff did not rely reasonably upon the alleged promises.

16

TWELVETH DEFENSE
(Recovery reduced by comparative fault)

17
17.

18
19

As and for a twelveth separate affinnative defense, the defendant alleges that any

recovery by plaintiff is barred or must be reduced as a result of plaintiff's comparative fault.

20
21

THIRTEENTH DEFENSE
(Recovery reduced by setoft)

22
18.
23
24

As and for a thirteenth separate affinnative defense, the defendant alleges that

any recovery by plaintiff must be set off or reduced, abated, or apportioned to the extent
that any

ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
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•

Roark Law Firm

P. 005/010

FAX No. 1087 88.

other party's actions caused or contributed to damages, if any there were.

2

FOURTEENTH DEFENSE
(Failure of condition precedent to defendant's performance)

3

19.
4

5
6

As and for a fourteenth separate affirmative defense, the defendant alleges that,

to the extent plaintiff alleges the defendant has any obligation or duty as to which
full
performance has not been rendered or excused, not all conditions precedent to said obligatio
ns
or duties occuned.

7

FIFTHTEENTH DEFENSE

8
9

(Defendant obligations void or excused)

20.

As and for a :fifthteenth separate affinnative defense, the defendant alleges that,

10

to the extent plaintiff alleges the defendant had any obligation as to which full performance
has

11

not been rendered or excused, that obligation did not exist or was based upon acts or omission
s

12

that were void or otherwise extinguished.

13

SIXTEENTH DEFENSE
(Failure of conside.-ation)

14
21.

15

16

As and for a sixteenth separate affinnative defense, the defendant alleges that, to

the extent plaintiff alleges the defendant have any obligation as to which full performance
has
not been rendered or excused, there has been a-failure of consideration.

17

SEVENTEENTH DEFENSE
18
19

(Plaintiff bad faith)

22.

As and for a seventeenth separate affirmative defense, the defendant alleges that

20

plaintiff s bad faith bars their claims or that any dainages must be reduced as a result of plaintiff'

21

comparative bad faith.

22
23

24
ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
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1

EIGHTE ENTH DEFENSE
(Right to add additional affirmative defenses)

2

3

26.

As and for a eighteenth separate affinnative defense, the defendant alleges that

4

because the complaint herein is couched in conclusionary terms and because discovery has not

5

been undertaken, answering defendant cannot fully anticipate all affirmative defenses that may

6

be applicable to the within action.

7

defenses, if and to the extent that such affirmative defenses are applicable, is hereby reserved.

8

Defendant also reserves the right to amend this ANSWER to delete any affirmative defense

9

which, following reasonable discovery, may prove inapplicable.

10

Accordingly, the right to assert additional affinnative

CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY FEES

11

As a result of the filing of this action, Defendant has been i-equired to retain the legal

12

services of The Roark Law Finn of Hailey, Idaho, and to incur attorney fees for which they are

13

entitled to reimburse ment from the Plaintiff herein.

14

PRAYER

15

The Plaintiffs Complaint, as to all counts and all prayers of relief, be

16
17
18
19

20

dismissed and the Plaintiff talce nothing thereby.

2.

That the Defendant be awarded their reasonable costs and fees incurred

in the defense herein, including a reasonable attorney fee.

3.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and proper.

21

22
23
24

ANSWE R AND COUNTER-CLAil\tI
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1

Defend ant hereby demands a trial by jury on all issues so triable pursuan t to
Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b).

4

COUN TER-C LAIM

5
6

P. 007/010

DEMA ND FOR JURY TRIAL

2

3

FAX No. 20878 84'

1. Counte r-defen dant Primer a Beef, LLC, according to its avenne nts in this
action, is
Texas limited liability compan y conducting business in the State ofldaho .

7

2. Defend ant Allan Ward ("Defendant" or "Ward") at all times relevant herein
has

8

been, and present ly is, a residen t of Cassia Cou11ty, Idaho and operates a busines
s designated

9

as "Little Moo Cattle Compa ny LLC".

10

3. On or about Novem ber 10, 2016 Primera and Ward entered into an agreem
ent

11

("Settlement Agreem ent") settling the matters at issue in Cassia County Case
No. CV-2016-

12

859.

13

4. The Settlem ent Agreem ent include d a provisi on requiring all parties thereto
keep

14

the tenns of the Settlement Agreem ent confidential and affixing liquidated damage
s for the

15

breach of that provision.

16

5. Paragra ph 7 of the Settlement Agreem ent was intended and designed to limit
such

17

agreement to the Civil action and not the criminal action that the parties acknow
ledged had

18

been filed by the Cassia County Prosecu ting Attorne y against Counter-claim

19

the same facts and circumstances as the civil action.

20

ant based upon

6 .. The Counter-defendants had a duty of good faith and fair dealing not to
use the

21

civil action or the settlem ent agreement to intimidate the Counte r-defen dant
in his defense of

22

the criminal action against him.

23

24

ANSWER AND COUNTER-CLAIM
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I 0. Notwit hstandi ng that duty and obligation, by the filing of this action and
other
efforts, have intimidated, harasse d and hindere d the Counter-defendant in his
effo11s to

3

pursue his defense of the criminal action and exercise his rights under the Constit
ution of the

4

United States as well as the Constit ution and statutes of the State ofidah o.

5

11. As a result of the breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing by the Counte
r-

6

defendant, the Counte r-claim ant has suffere d financial and emotional damage
s in an amount

7

to be detenni ned at trial.

8
CLAIM FOR ATTOR NEY FEES
9
10

11

As a result of the filing of this action, Defendant has been required to retain
the legal
services of The Roark Law Firm of Hailey, Idaho, and to incur attorney fees
for which they are
entitled to reimbursement from the Plaintiff herein.

12
PRAYE R FOR RELIEF
13

14
15

WHER EFORE , Counte r-claim ant prays this Cou11 for Judgme nt against the
Counterdefenda nts as follows:

16

1. For an award of damage s in an amow1t to be determ ined at trial.

17

2. For costs and fees inctme d herein.

18

3. For such other and further relief as the Court deems just and appropriate.

19
DEMA ND FOR JURY TRIAL

20
21

Counte r-claim ant hereby demand s a trial by jury on all issues so triable pursuan
t to
Idaho Rule of Civil Proced ure 38(b ).

22
23
24
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1
2

DATED this

tif::

P. 009/010

of April, 2017

3
4

5

meyfor
6

Allan Ward, Defendant

7
8

9

11
12
13

14
15

16
17
18
19

20
21

22
23

24
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CERT IFICA TE OF SERV ICE

2

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on theZ ftay of April, 2017, I served a true
and

3

correct copy of the within and foregoing docum ent upon the attorney(s) named
below

4

in the manne r noted:
Kimberly L. Williams
Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP
P.O. Box16 8
Jerome , ID 83338

5
6
7

By deposi ting copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage
prepaid , at the post office at Hailey, Idaho.

8
9

10
11

/

By hand delivering copies of the same to the office of the attorney(s) at
his offices in Hailey, Idaho.
By telecopying copies of same to said attorney(s) at the telecopier
numbe r: 208-32 4-3135

12
13
14

15
16

17
18
19
20

21
22
23

24
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE 5th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO

On: 05/12/2017 at 10:11 a.m.
JOSEPH W. LARSEN
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
Filed By: tg

KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
IDAHO STA TE BAR NO. 8893
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEIC H, LLP
Attorneys at Law
153 East Main Street
P. 0. Box 168
Jerome, Idaho 83338
Telephone: (208) 324-2303
Facsimile: (208) 324-3135
klwilliams@wmlattys.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,
vs
ALLAN WARD, an individual,

Case No. CV-2017-0000290 D

PLAINTIFF' S MOTION TO DISMISS
DEFENDANT 'S COUNTERC LAIM FOR
FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM UPON
WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED

Defendant.

COMES NOW, PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, Plaintiff in the above entitled action, by and
through its attorney of record Kimberly L. Williams, of the firm Williams, Meservy &
Lothspeich, LLP, and hereby moves this Court for an Order dismissing Defendant's
MOTION TO DISMISS - 1
\\SERVER\SHARE\KLW\CLIENTS\PRIMERA BEEF, LLC\PLEADINGS\MOTION TO DISMISS 12B6.DOC

Page 26

counterclaim pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendant's Counterclaim
fails to plead facts sufficient to provide relief under the laws of Idaho. In the Alternative,
Plaintiff requests this Court dismiss the counter-claim on the pleadings pursuant to Idaho
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c).
This Motion is supported by Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs
Motion to Dismiss Defendant's Counterclaim for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which
Relief Can be Granted, and is incorporated herein by this reference.
DATED this 12 th day of May, 2017.
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP

JL (_,{_~_}
KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
Attorney for Plaintiff

MOTION TO DISMISS - 2
IISERVERISHARE\KL W\CLIENTS\PRIMERA BEEF, LLCIPLEADINGS\MOTION TO DISMISS 12B6.DOC
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this 12th day of May, 2017, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document on the person(s) whose names and addresses appear below
by the method indicated:
R. Keith Roark
THE ROARK LAW FIRM, LLP
515 S. 1st Avenue
Hailey, Idaho 83333

•
•
•
•

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivery• Court Folder
Facsimile -208.788.3918
Federal Express

• Email: keith@roarklaw.com
carolyn@roarklaw.com

KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS

MOTION TO DISMISS - 3
\\SERVER\SHARE\KLW\CLIENTS\PRIMER A BEEF, LLC\PLEADINGS\MOTION TO DISMISS 12B6.ooc
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE 5th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO

On: 06/12/2017 at 2:54 p.m.
KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS

IDAHO STATE BAR NO. 8893
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP
Attorneys at Law
153 East Main Street
P. 0. Box 168
Jerome, Idaho 83338
Telephone: (208) 324-2303
Facsimile: (208) 324-3135
klwilliams@wmlattys.com

JOSEPH W. LARSEN
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
Filed By: tg

Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,

Case No. CV-2017-0000290 D

Plaintiff,

ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM

vs
ALLAN WARD, an individual,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, Plaintiff, PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, by and through its attorney,
Kimberly L. Williams, of the law firm Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP, and
answers Plaintifrs Counterclaim as follows:
I.

Plaintiff admits the allegations of paragraphs I through 5, of the Counterclaim.

II.

Plaintiff denies the allegations of paragraphs 6, 10, and 11 of the Counterclaim.
ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM

-1-
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III.

The Counterclaim does not contain paragraphs numbered 7, 8, or 9, and to the
extent necessary to preserve its right to respond, Plaintiff denies any allegations intended
by those paragraphs of the Counterclaim.
IV.
Plaintiff demands a trial by jury of no less than twelve ( 12) persons on all issues so
triable pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 38(b).

V.
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays relief as follows:
1.

For Plaintiff's reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in defending this

action, pursuant to Idaho Code§§ 12-120 and 12-121 and in accordance with the
Settlement Agreement.
2.

For such other and further relief as the court may determine to be

appropriate.

DATED this l ih day of June, 2017.
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP

JL u_,_:____;
KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS, Attorney for Plaintiff

ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM

-2-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this lih day of June, 2017, I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document on the person(s) whose names and addresses
appear below by the method indicated:
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivery• Court Folder
Facsimile -208.788.3918
Federal Express
lg] Email: keith@roarklaw.com
carolyn@roarklaw.com

•
•
•
•

R. Keith Roark
THE ROARK LAW FIRM, LLP
515 S. 1st Avenue
Hailey, Idaho 83333

KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS

ANSWER TO COUNTERCLAIM

-3-
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FILED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
THE 5th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO

11/17/2017 4:50 pm
JOSEPH W. LARSEN
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

,fl=

KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS

IDAHO STATE BAR NO. 8893
WJLLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP
Attorneys at Law
153 East Main Street
P. 0. Box 168
Jerome, Idaho 83338
Telephone : (208) 324-2303
Facsimile: (208) 324-313 5
klwilliams@wmlattys.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,

Case No. CV-2017-0000290 D

Plaintiff,

ORDER TO FILE UNDER SEAL

vs
ALLAN WARD, an individual,
Defendant.

THIS MATIER having come before this honorable Court pursuant to the Motion to File
Under Seal filed by the the Plaintiff, and good cause appearing, the Court determines the
document to be sealed contains facts or statements, the dissemination or publication of which
could result in economic or financial loss to one or both parties to this matter. The Court further
determines That it is necessary to temporarily seal the documents to preserve the right to a fair
trial.

ORDER TO FILE UNDER SEAL

-1-
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IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Plaintiff is allowed to file the confidential
Settlement Agreement and Mutual Agreement entered into between the Plaintiff and
Defendant under seal.
Signed: 11/17/2017 04:47 PM

DATED

~P.7d-te
JUDGE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
11/20/2017
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on _ _Signed:
__
_ _01:15
_PM
_ _ _ _ , I served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document on the person(s) whose names and addresses appear
below by the method indicated:

□

R. Keith Roark
THE ROARK LAW FIRM, LLP
515 S. !81 Avenue
Hailey, Idaho 83333

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
□ Hand Delivery □ Court Folder
□ Facsimile
□ Federal Express
□

X□
Kimberly L. Williams
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP
153 East Main Street
P. 0. Box 168
Jerome, Idaho 83338

Email
Efile/Eserve: keith@roarklaw.com
carolyn@roarklaw.com

□

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivery □ Court Folder
□ Facsimile
□ Federal Express
□ Email
X□ Efile/Eserve: klwilliams@wmlattys.com
□

CLERK

ORDER TO FILE UNDER SEAL

-2-
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Electronically Filed
5/3/2018 11:42 AM
Fifth Judicial District, Cassia County
Joseph W. Larsen, Clerk of the Court
By: DeeAnn Dixon, Deputy Clerk

DA YID T. KRU ECK, ISB No. 6246
THOMAS J. LLOYD Ill, ISB No. 7772
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 319-2600
Facsimile: (208) 319-2601
Email: dkrueck@greenerlaw.com
tlloyd@greenerlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,

Case No. CV-2017-290

Plaintiff,

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
ALLAN WARD, an individual,
Defendant.

COMES NOW Defendant Allan Ward, by and through his counsel of record
David T. Krueck and Thomas J. Llo yd III of the firm GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OB ERRECHT
P.A. , and pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56, hereby respectfully submits this Motion for
Summary Judgment. By this Motion, Defendant seeks an order from the Court granting summary
judgment in favor of Defendant Allan Ward on the basis that there is no genuine dispute of material
fact that neither Mr. Ward nor anyone acting with his authority breached the terms of the Settlement
Agreement, and further finding that the liquidated damages provisions in the parties' settlement
agreement is unenforceable as a matter of law.

DEFENDA T'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY J UDGMENT -

I
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This Motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Defendant' s Motion for
Summary Judgment, the Declaration of Allan Ward in Support of Defendant' s Motion for Summary
Judgment, and the Declaration of David T. Krueck in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment filed contemporaneously herewith, as well as the pleadings and papers on file in this
matter.
Oral argument is requested.

DATED this 3rd day of May, 2018.
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A.

By:_:~~
-~~-- - --~-=-- =--------David T. Krueck, Of the Firm
Thomas J. Lloyd III
Attorneys for Defendant

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3 rd day of May, 2018, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals by the method
indicated below, addressed as follows:
Kimberly L. Williams
Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP
15 3 East Main Street
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, ID 83338
Email: klwilliams@wmlattys.com

U.S. Mail
___ Facsimile - (208) 324-3135
_ _ _ Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
- - - Email
iCourt E-Service
X
---

David T. Krueck
Thomas J. Lloyd III

DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3

Page 36

Electronically Filed
5/3/2018 11:42 AM
Fifth Judicial District, Cassia County
Joseph W. Larsen, Clerk of the Court
By: DeeAnn Dixon, Deputy Clerk

DA YID T. KRUECK, ISB No. 6246
THOMAS J. LLOYD III, ISB No. 7772
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, ID 83 702
Telephone: (208) 319-2600
Facsimile: (208) 319-2601
Email: dkrueck@greenerlaw.com
tlloyd@greenerlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,

Case No. CV-2017-290

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
ALLAN WARD, an individual,
Defendant.

COMES NOW Defendant Allan Ward, by and through his counsel of record
David T. Krueck and Thomas J. Lloyd 1111 of the firm GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT
P.A., and hereby respectfully submits this Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Summary
Judgment.

I.

INTRODUCTION

This action arises out of a Settlement Agreement executed by the parties in November,
2016, in conjunction with prior litigation venued in this Court, Case No. CV 2016-859 ("the
underlying lawsuit"). (Declaration of Allan Ward in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary
Judgment ("Ward Dec."),

,r 6,

Ex. A.) The Settlement Agreement, entered into between Plaintiff

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1
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Primera Beef, LLC ("Primera") and Defendant Allan Ward ("Ward"), individually and on behalf of
his company, Little Moo Cattle Company, LLC, was upon information and belief executed by all
parties and their respective counsel. 1 (Id.) For Primera, the Agreement was executed by Mr. Dustin
Dean and by its attorney, Gary D. Slette of Robertson & Slette, PLLC; for Ward and Little Moo
Cattle Company, the Agreement was executed by Ward and his attorney, R. Keith Roark of The
Roark Law Firm, LLP. (Id.) The Agreement included a confidentiality clause, combined with a nondisparagement clause. (Id.)
After entering into the Settlement Agreement, Ward continued to engage his attorney,
Mr. Roark, to defend him in a related criminal matter then pending in Cassia County. Following the

parties' settlement in the underlying lawsuit, Mr. Roark drafted and sent a letter to the Prosecuting
Attorney for Cassia County in an effort to have the related criminal charges dismissed. (Declaration
of David T. Krueck in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed
contemporaneously herewith ("Krueck Dec."), , 4, Ex. A.) Within that letter, which was neither
directed, authorized, nor reviewed by Ward, Mr. Roark notified the Prosecuting Attorney of the
parties' settlement in the underlying lawsuit. Primera's claim for breach of the Settlement
Agreement is solely based upon Mr. Roark's letter to the Prosecuting Attorney. Primera seeks
liquidated damages in the amount of twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000.00) for the alleged
breach. (Primera's Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial, filed March 13, 2017 ("Complaint"), ,,
11, 12.)

1

Ward does not have in his possession a fully-executed version of the Settlement Agreement, nor has one
been provided in discovery. Thus, Ward reserves any and all arguments that he may have regarding the validity
and/or finality of the Settlement Agreement until he is provided a fully-executed copy, and assumes only for the
sake of this Motion that the Settlement Agreement was fully executed.

MEMORANDUM IN SlWPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 2
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II.

LEGALSTANDARD

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) instructs that a court "must grant summary judgment if
the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." LR.C.P. 56(a). "Summary judgment is appropriate where the
nonmoving party bearing the burden of proof fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case." Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 145
Idaho 408,410, 179 P.3d 1064, 1066 (2008).
"The nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that
an issue of material fact exists to establish a genuine issue." Nw. Bee-Corp v.
Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 838, 41 P.3d 263, 266 (2002) (internal
citation omitted). Accordingly, "[t]he moving party is entitled to judgment
when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will
bear the burden of proof at trial." Badell v. Beeks, 115 Idaho 101, 102, 765
P.2d 126, 127 (1988) (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S. Ct.
2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)).

Lincoln Land Co., Ltd. Liab. Co. v. LP Broadband, Inc., 408 P.3d 465, 468-69 (Idaho 2017).
In the instant case, Primera has asserted a single cause of action against Ward, alleging that
Ward breached the confidentiality term of the Settlement Agreement. "The elements for a claim for
breach of contract are: (a) the existence of the contract, (b) the breach of the contract, (c) the breach
caused damages, and (d) the amount of those damages." Safaris Unlimited, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Jones,
158 Idaho 846, 850, 353 P.3d 1080, 1084 (2015) (citing Masell Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co.,
154 Idaho 269, 278, 297 P.3d 232, 241 (2013)). "When the language of a contract is clear and
unambiguous, its interpretation and legal effect are questions of law." Lamprecht v. Jordan, LLC,
139 Idaho 182, 185, 75 P.3d 743, 746 (2003). For a claim of breach of contract to succeed, it is
implicit in these elements that the contractual terms must be valid and enforceable and that the
breach must have been committed by the defendant against whom the cause of action is asserted.
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III.

UNDISPUTED FACTS

The undisputed facts ofthis case are relatively straightforward, as follows:
1.

The parties were previously involved in a civil lawsuit in the Fifth Judicial District

of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Cassia, Case No. CV 2016-859 ("the underlying
lawsuit"). (Complaint, ,r 5.)
2.

The parties resolved the underlying lawsuit by way of a Settlement Agreement

entered into on or about November 10, 2016. (Complaint, ,r 6.)
3.

The parties' Settlement Agreement included a confidentiality provision, as follows:
Except as otherwise required by this Agreement, law, or order of a
court of competent jurisdiction, the parties shall keep the terms of
this Agreement strictly confidential. The parties further agree that
neither shall hereafter disparage the name or character of the other in
any way. Each party agrees that it will not make any negative or
derogatory comments to the media, to their colleagues, or to any
members of the public concerning the other party, or any of their
respective past or present officers, members or directors. The remedy
for any breach of this provision shall be the recovery of liquidated
damages incurred as a result of such breach at the rate of $25,000.00
per occurrence.

(Ward Dec., ,r 6, Ex. A; Complaint, ,r 7.)
4.

The Settlement Agreement was executed by Mr. Gary Slette (attorney for Primera),

Mr. Dustin Dean (for Primera), Mr. Allan Ward (individually and for Little Moo Cattle Company,

LLC), and Mr. Keith Roark (attorney for Ward and Little Moo). (Ward Dec., ,r 6, Ex. A.)
5.

Approximately two months after the parties entered into the Settlement Agreement,

while representing Ward in another matter, Keith Roark disclosed certain of the terms of the
Settlement Agreement to the Cassia County Prosecuting Attorney by way of a written letter.
(Complaint, ,r 8; Krueck Dec., ,r 4, Ex. A.)
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6.

Prior to Mr. Roark's disclosure of the terms of the Settlement Agreement to the

Cassia County Prosecuting Attorney, Ward had not authorized Mr. Roark to make any such
disclosure. (Ward Dec., ,r,r 8-9.)
7.

Ward has never personally breached the terms of the Settlement Agreement, nor

authorized anyone else to breach the Settlement Agreement on his behalf. (Ward Dec., 1 11.)
The foregoing facts are established in the record, and will not change prior to or during the
trial of this matter. Accordingly, the Court may make judgment as a matter of law on these
undisputed facts, and summary judgment is therefore the appropriate disposition of this case.
IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

Ward Has Not Breached the Settlement Agreement.

In its Complaint and discovery responses, Primera acknowledges and admits that Ward,
himself, has never breached the terms of the Settlement Agreement. (Complaint,

11 8, 11; Krueck

Dec., Ex. B.) Rather, as pled in the Complaint, the only individual who has allegedly disclosed the
terms of the Settlement Agreement in violation of the Settlement Agreement was Ward's former
attorney, Keith Roark. (Id.) Importantly, it is further indisputable that Ward neither reviewed,
requested, nor authorized the disclosure of the settlement terms to the Cassia County Prosecuting
Attorney. (Id.) Accordingly, there can be no argument that Ward has actually breached the contract,
nor any argument that Ward is liable to Primera for any measure of damages due to his own
conduct. On these undisputed facts, entry of summary judgment in favor of Ward is proper.
Because Primera cannot point to any conduct of, or authorized by, Ward, it has instead
attempted to impose liability upon Ward on a theory of agency: "Ward breached the Settlement
Agreement by his agent's disclosure of the material terms of the Settlement Agreement in violation
of the confidentiality provision." (Complaint,

,r 11

(emphasis added).) However, there is no set of

facts upon which Primera can prove that Ward ought to be held liable for Mr. Roark's disclosure
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 5

Page 41

under any theory of agency recognized under Idaho law. Consequently, Ward is entitled to entry of
summary judgment in his favor.
In Idaho, the Supreme Court has recognized "three types of agency, any of which are
sufficient to bind the principal to a contract entered into by an agent with a third party, and make the
principal responsible for the agent's tortious acts, so long as the agent has acted within the course
and scope of authority delegated by the principal. The three types of agency are: express authority,
implied authority, and apparent authority." Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho
109, 112,206 P.3d 473,476 (2009) (quoting Bailey v. Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 708 P.2d 900 (1985).)
Primera cannot demonstrate that Ward ought to be held liable according to any of the foregoing
theories of agency.
First, "[e]xpress authority refers to that authority which the principal has explicitly granted
the agent to act in the principal's name. The declarations of an alleged agent, standing alone, are
insufficient to prove that the principal has conferred such authority." Muniz v. Schrader, 115 Idaho
497, 500, 767 P.2d 1272, 1275 (Ct. App. 1989) (internal citations omitted). As set forth in the
concurrently-filed Declaration of Allan Ward, Ward neither authorized nor even knew that Mr.
Roark had intended to disclose the terms of his settlement with Primera to the Cassia County
Prosecuting Attorney. (Ward Dec., ,, 8-9.) Under these circumstances, there can be no genuine
dispute of material fact that Mr. Roark did not have the express authority of Ward to disclose the
terms of the Settlement Agreement to the Cassia County Prosecuting Attorney.
Second, "[i]mplied authority refers to that authority 'which is necessary, usual, and proper to
accomplish or perform' the express authority delegated to the agent by the principal." Tri-Circle v.
Brugger Corp., 121 Idaho 950, 954, 829 P.2d 540, 544 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting Bailey, 109 Idaho

at 497, 708 P.2d at 902). Thus, the mere fact that Mr. Roark had been retained (and therefore had
express authority) to represent Ward in the criminal proceedings does not lead to a legal conclusion
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that every action taken by Mr. Roark fell within the scope of implied authority. Rather, in order for
a theory of implied authority to survive, Primera must prove that disclosure of the confidential terms
of the Settlement Agreement was "necessary, usual, and proper" in the performance of Mr. Roark's
duties as Ward's criminal attorney. Simply stated, it was not. Only two months prior to the letter of
January 9, 2017, Mr. Roark had negotiated the Settlement Agreement on Ward's behalf, and

Mr. Roark signed the Settlement Agreement. Mr. Roark was therefore well aware of the
confidentiality provision in the Agreement, and although he continued to represent Ward in the
ongoing criminal proceeding, there can be no genuine dispute that it is not "necessary, usual, [or]
proper" for an attorney to violate the terms of his client's ongoing contractual obligations, at least
without first discussing and obtaining express authority to do so. Indeed, the fundamental basis of
Primera's Complaint belies any notion of implied authority in this instance: If, as Primera
complains, the disclosure of the terms of the Settlement Agreement was improper (i.e. a breach of
the Agreement), then Mr. Roark's conduct in allegedly doing so could not be "necessary, usual, and
proper." Ward is entitled to summary judgment on this additional basis.

Finally, "[a]pparent authority differs from express and implied authority in that it is not
based on the words and conduct of the principal toward the agent, but on the principal' s words and
conduct toward the third party. Apparent authority may be found when a principal 'voluntarily
places an agent in such a position that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with the business
usages and the nature of a particular business, is justified in believing that the agent is acting
pursuant to existing authority."' Tri-Circle, 121 Idaho at 954-55 (citing Bailey, 109 Idaho at 497,
708 P.2d at 902). "Consequently, apparent authority cannot arise from the acts and statements of the
agent alone; it must be based upon the principal's words and conduct." Landvik v. Herbert (in Re
Landvik), 130 Idaho 54, 59, 936 P.2d 697, 702 (Ct. App. 1997). "The doctrine of apparent authority

arose in the arena of contract law and addresses circumstances in which an agent, acting without
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actual authority, may nonetheless bind the principal to a contract entered into by the agent with a
third party." Landvik, 130 Idaho at 59. Because apparent authority arises in circumstances wherein a
third party is involved, "apparent authority involves an element of reliance on the part of the third
party." Id. (emphasis added). As a result, the doctrine of apparent authority is inapplicable to the

facts at issue in this case. Ward made no statements nor undertook any conduct that would convey
to either Primera or the Cassia County Prosecuting Attorney that Mr. Roark was authorized to
disclose the confidential terms of the Settlement Agreement on his behalf. Moreover, the alleged
"injured party" in this case (Primera) did not rely on anything stated by Mr. Roark in the
communications wherein the alleged breaches occurred - in fact, Primera was not a part of those
conversations until sometime after they were made. The doctrine of apparent authority is
inapplicable to these facts, and provides no basis for permitting Primera's claim of principal-agent
liability against Ward to survive.
B.

The Liquidated
Unenforceable.

Damages

Clause

of the

Settlement

Agreement

is

In addition to the fact that neither Ward nor any alleged agent acting with his authority
has breached the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Primera's claim is further defective in that
it seeks recovery under a liquidated damages clause that is not enforceable as a matter of law.
The Idaho Supreme Court has articulated the test for determining the enforceability of a
liquidated damages clause, as follows:
A liquidated damage provision should be enforced:
in any case where the circumstances are such that accurate
determination of the damages would be difficult or impossible, and
provided that the liquidated damages fixed by the contract bear a
reasonable relation to actual damages. But, where the forfeiture or
damage fixed by the contract is arbitrary and bears no reasonable
relation to the anticipated damage, and is exorbitant and
unconscionable, it is regarded as a "penalty", and the contractual
provision therefor is void and unenforceable.
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Schroeder v. Partin, 151 Idaho 471, 476, 259 P.3d 617, 622 (2011) (citing Graves v. Cupic, 75

Idaho 451, 456, 272 P.2d 1020, 1023 (1954)). When a party demonstrates that "the liquidated
damages are not reasonably related to actual damages, and/or are exorbitant and
unconscionable," the liquidated damages clause must be held unenforceable. Id. "[I]n evaluating
the validity of a liquidated damages clause, the focus is on whether the provision bears a
reasonable relation to the anticipated damages occasioned by a breach." Id. at 477. "Thus, as
long as a liquidated damages clause is intended at the outset to reasonably compensate a party for
potential damages resulting from a breach, rather than to deter or punish the breach, the clause
will be enforceable." Id. at 477-78. "[I]t is for the trial court to determine whether under the facts
the amount stipulated is arbitrary and bears no reasonable relation to the anticipated damages and
is so exorbitant and unconscionable as to be regarded as a penalty." Nichols v. Knowles, 87 Idaho
550, 556, 394 P.2d 630, 633 (1964). "[W]here the facts make the damage agreed to an
unconscionable penalty, equity will intercede to grant relief." Howard v. Bar Bell Land & Cattle
Co., 81 Idaho 189,197,340 P.2d 103, 107 (1959).

On the facts of this case, the liquidated damages clause in the Settlement Agreement is
unenforceable as a matter of law. As set forth above, it is a material element of an enforceable
liquidated damages clause that the parties contemplate "at the outset" what reasonable
compensation might be in the event of a breach. Schroeder, 151 Idaho at 477-78. In this instance,
however, no such discussions were ever had during the negotiations over the Settlement
Agreement. (Ward Dec.,

,r,r

12-13.) Moreover, a $25,000 liquidated damages provision for an

alleged breach of a confidentiality provision - which does not carry with it any real risk of
monetary or compensable damage - is not reasonably related to the actual damages that Primera
could possibly suffer, or reasonably anticipate suffering, as a result of such a breach. Primera
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will be unable to demonstrate that it has suffered any level of real and compensable damages that
are anywhere near the arbitrary liquidated damages amount set forth in the Settlement
Agreement, as is required for the Court to assess the reasonableness of the liquidated damages
clause. See Nichols v. Knowles, 87 Idaho 550, 394 P.2d 630 (1964); Clampitt v. A.MR. Corp.,
109 Idaho 145, 706 P.2d 34 (1985). Under these circumstances, there is no evidence that the
$25,000 liquidated damages clause bears any "reasonable relation to the anticipated damage,"
but is instead "exorbitant and unconscionable .... " Clampitt, 109 Idaho at 148 (citing Graves,
75 Idaho at 456). Ward respectfully submits, this liquidated damages clause must be "regarded as
a 'penalty', and the contractual provision therefore is void and unenforceable." Id.

V.

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, there is no genuine dispute that Defendant Allan Ward did not
breach the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Neither he, nor anyone acting with his authority
to do so, disclosed the terms of the Settlement Agreement to any person. Mr. Ward cannot be
held liable for a disclosure of such terms that he neither made nor authorized. Summary
judgment is therefore appropriate and proper on Primera's singular claim against Ward. In the
event the Court determines Ward is not entitled to summary judgment dismissing the breach of
contract claim against him, the Court should hold that the liquidated damages provision in the
Settlement Agreement is unenforceable as a matter of law, and require Primera to prove actual
damages suffered at trial.
DATED this 3rd day of May, 2018.
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A.

By:

~tk,

Of the Firm

Thomas J. Lloyd III
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3rd day of May, 2018, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals by the method
indicated below, addressed as follows:
Kimberly L. Williams
Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP
153 East Main Street
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, ID 83338
Email: klwilliams@wmlattys.com

- - - U.S. Mail
- - Facsimile - (208) 324-3135
___ Overnight Mail
___ Hand Delivery
- - - Email
x iCourt E-Service
---='-=---

David T. Krueck
Thomas J. Lloyd III
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Electronically Filed
5/3/2018 11:42 AM
Fifth Judicial District, Cassia County
Joseph W. Larsen, Clerk of the Court
By: DeeAnn Dixon, Deputy Clerk

DAVID T. KRUECK, ISB No. 6246
THOMAS J. LLOYD III, ISB No. 7772
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 319-2600
Facsimile: (208) 319-2601
Email: dkrueck@greenerlaw.com
tlloyd@greenerlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

Case No. CV-2017-290

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,

DECLARATION OF DAVID T.
KRUECK IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
ALLAN WARD, an individual,
Defendant.

I, DAYID T. KRUECK, hereby state and declare:
1.

I am at least eighteen (18) years of age and am competent to testify regarding the

matters set forth herein.
2.

I am one of the attorneys of record for Defendant Allan Ward in the above

entitled matter and I make this declaration based upon my own personal knowledge. If called as
a witness, I could and would competently testify as to the truth of the matters set forth herein.
3.

This Declaration is being submitted in support of Defendant's Motion for

Summary Judgment.
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4.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "A" is a true and correct copy of a letter that I

understand to have been drafted and sent by my client's former attorney, R. Keith Roark, to the
Cassia County Prosecuting Attorney on or about January 9, 2017. I obtained a copy of this letter
as part of Plaintiffs Response to Defendant's First Set of Requests for Production of Documents.
5.

Attached hereto as Exhibit "B" is a true and correct copy of Plaintiff Primera

Beef, LLC's Response to Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production of
Documents to Plaintiff (written responses only, without documents produced). In response to
Interrogatory No. 7, which seeks information relating to any and all alleged breaches of the
parties' Settlement Agreement, Plaintiff has confirmed that it is unaware of any alleged breaches
by Mr. Ward, individually, and that this lawsuit is based entirely upon the alleged breach of
Mr. Ward's former attorney, Mr. Keith Roark, by way of written correspondence dated
January 9, 2017.
I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the
foregoing is true and correct.
EXECUTED this 3rd day of May, 2018.

David T. Krueck
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 3rd day of May, 2018, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals by the method
indicated below, addressed as follows:
Kimberly L. Williams
Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP
153 East Main Street
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, ID 83338
Email: klwilliams@wmlattys.com

__
__
___
___

U.S.Mail
Facsimile - (208) 324-3135
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Email
---x
- - iCourt E-Service

~

David T. Krueck
Thomas J. Lloyd III
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THE

ROARK

HAILEY
515 SOUTH isr AVENUE
HAILEY, IDAH083333
TEL: (208) 788-2427
FAX: (208) 788-3918

January 9, 2017

f[';l:t.1ccord Larsen

:)f ~( :Cassia County Prosecuting Attorney

i~ t~ie~~~

.i!lf

83318

Re:

State ofIdaho vs. Alan Ward
Cassia County Case No. CV-2016-4577

Dear McCord:
I am writing in regard to the above referenced case. I feel strongly that the case should now be
dismissed because the parties have settled and I don't believe you have the evidence to prove the elements
of a theft charge.
Mr. Ward is currently charged with taking the property (Waygu Calves and $83,000) from
Primera Beef, LLC with the intent to deprive the owner thereof of such property. Idaho Code §182402(3) defines "deprive" as:
(3) "Deprive." To "deprive" another of property means:
(a) To withhold it or cause it to be withheld from him permanently or for so extended a period or
under such circumstances that the major portion of its economic value or benefit is lost to him; or
(b) To dispose of the property in such manner or under such circumstances as to render it unlikely
that an owner will recover such property.
This case arose out of a legitimate belief on my client's part that Primera had breached its contract
with him for the purchase and sale of a number of calves, only a portion of which were the Waygu
calves. He was receiving legal advice at the time and sincerely believed that he had every legal right to
take the actions he did. After I entered both the civil and criminal cases a decision was made to proceed
in a different manner in order to get the matter resolved and move on.
Not only did my client not intend to deprive Primera Beef, LLC of its property, no such
deprivation took place. In point of fact, the parties arrived at and have fully executed a complete
settlement and release of all outstanding claims. Indeed, Mr. Ward actually enhanced the economic value
of the property returned to Primera Beef agreeing to pay 1) $15,000 in attorney fees, 2) $500 per head for
every calf that died during the time between July 15 and November 10, 2016 3) $500 per head for each
and every calf rejected by Primera's veterinarian for sickness, lameness or disease. Furthermore, my

-----------------------------·
WWW,ROARKLAW,COM
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client fed the calves during the entire period of time, thus relieving Primera of thousands of dollars in feed
cost. Had Mr. Ward not held the calves, Primera would have been required to stand the mortality losses,
sickness and disease losses and feed the calves for the July 15 to November 10 period. You, as a
stockman yourself, understand what the cost of feeding nearly 170 calves for four months amounts
to. Since the calves will not be harvested until they are approximately 2 years old, more than 20% of the
feed costs to get them there was borne by Mr. Ward to the benefit of Primera.
I am not disputing or criticizing your initial decision to charge in this case. I am simply looking at
the elements you are required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt and pointing out that you probably
won't get this case past preliminary hearing, and if you do you very likely won't survive a Rule 29
motion after your case in chief and certainly will not prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial that Alan
Ward intended to deprive and/or did deprive Primera of the Waygu calves or their value.

I am sure you and your office have many, many important and provable cases that you are
working on now and will see many more such cases throughout this coming year. I see no interest your
office, the taxpayers of Cassia County, or Primera Beef have in proceeding any further with a case that
has been settled, civilly, in its entirety.
I hope to hear from you soon.
Sincerely,

RKR:cjl
cc: Client

PRIMERA 00008
Page 53

EXHIBITB

Page 54

KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
IDAHO STATE BAR NO. 8893
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP
Attorneys at Law
153 East Main Street
P. 0. Box 168
Jerome, Idaho 83338
Telephone: (208) 324-2303
Facsimile: (208) 324-3135
klwilliams@wmlattys.com

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,
vs
ALLAN WARD, an individual,

Case No. CV-2017-315

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF
INTERROGATORIES AND
REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
OF DOCUMENTS TO PLAINTIFF

Defendant.

COME NOW Plaintiff, PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited liability company, by
and through its attorney of record, Kimberly L. Williams, of the firm Williams, Meservy &
Lothspeich, LLP, and answers Defendant's First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents to Plaintiff as follows:

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO PLAINTIFF
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PREFATORY STATEMENT: Investigation, discovery and trial preparation in this action has

not yet been completed. As discovery proceeds, witnesses, facts, information, contentions and
evidence may be discovered that are not set forth in these Answers and Responses but which
may have been responsive to these Interrogatories and Requests. However, these Answers and
Responses are complete to the Plaintiffs best knowledge at this time.

These Answers and

Responses are subject to corrections for inadvertent errors or omissions, if any. Furthermore,
these Answers and Responses are based on the records and information presently available to
Plaintiff. Facts and evidence now known may not be fully understood, and the relevance and
consequences of such facts and evidence may not, in good faith, be included in the following
Responses.
Plaintiff reserves the right to refer to, incorporate, conduct discovery with reference to, or
offer into evidence at the time of trial any and all such witnesses, facts, contentions, information
and evidence developed during the course of this discovery and trial preparation notwithstanding
the evidence or references to witnesses, facts, contentions, information and evidence in these
Answers and Responses.
GENERAL OBJECTION

Plaintiff objects to each Interrogatory and Request for Production on the basis, and to the
extent that it seeks information invasive of the attorney client privilege and/or work-product
doctrine.
As discovery is ongoing, Plaintiff reserves the right to supplement these Answers and
Responses pursuant to LR.C.P. 26(e).

PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR
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ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES
INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Identify each person who assisted, participated, prepared,

supplied, or was relied upon in preparing the answers given to these Interrogatories and Requests
for Production and, if your answer contains more than one person, list all persons, and after each
name list the numbers of each answer which he or she assisted, participated, prepared, supplied
information, or was relied upon.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 1: Dustin Dean and Jason Peeler, owners of Plaintiff,
Gary Slette, Esq., attorney for Plaintiff in "the Lawsuit" (as defined in Defendant's First Set of
Interrogatories and Requests for Production of Documents to Plaintiff, Definition 11 ), and
Kimberly L. Williams, current counsel for Plaintiff.
INTERROGATORY NO. 2:

Please identify each and every person who has any

knowledge, or purports to have any knowledge, concerning the claims and allegations in
Primera's Complaint; and as to each such person, please state the fact or facts of which he or she
has knowledge or purports to have knowledge.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 2: As discovery is ongoing, Plaintiff reserves
the right supplement this Answer pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(e). Plaintiff identifies the following:
1. Dustin Dean and Jason Peeler, owners of Plaintiff, have knowledge of the interactions

giving rise to the Lawsuit, the course of, and settlement of, the Lawsuit.
2. Gary D. Slette, Esq. was counsel for Plaintiff in the Lawsuit, had interactions
regarding the Lawsuit and the terms of the settlement thereof. Mr. Slette also had
communications with McCord Larsen and Doug Abenroth of the Cassia County
Prosecuting Attorney's office. It was during the course of those communications that
Mr. Slette became aware of the breach of the confidentiality agreement.
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO PLAINTIFF
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3. McCord Larsen, Cassia County Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, has knowledge of
information provided to him by Keith Roark while acting as attorney for Defendant.
4. Keith Roark, attorney for Defendant in the Lawsuit and in the criminal action against
Defendant, has knowledge of the disclosure of the confidential terms of the settlement
agreement to McCord Larsen.
5. Defendant Allen Ward has knowledge regarding the Lawsuit, its resolution, the terms
of the Settlement Agreement, and regarding the criminal action against him, its
negotiation and resolultion.
INTERROGATORY NO. 3: Please identify each person that you might call to testify

as a lay witness at the trial of this action; and as to each such person, please state the substance of
the facts to which he or she is expected to testify.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 3:

Plaintiff has yet to determine those

individuals it may call as lay witnesses, but will supplement this answer when that determination
is made, or in compliance with the order governing such matters.

Please see Answer to

Interrogatory No. 2, above as individuals who might be called as witnesses at trial. Plaintiff
additionally reserves the right call as a witness any individual identified during the course of
discovery of this matter.
INTERROGATORY NO. 4: Please identify each and every expert you retained with

the anticipation of having that individual present expert testimony in this matter and include all
information required for each expert by Rule 26(b )( 4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 4:

Plaintiff has yet to determine those

individuals, if any, it may call as expert witnesses, but will supplement this answer when that
determination is made, or in compliance with the order governing such matters.
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO PLAINTIFF
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INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Please identify each document, object or thing intended to

be introduced or utilized as an exhibit at the trial of this matter. For each exhibit identified,
please state the facts intended to be proved by use of the exhibit or the relevance of the exhibit.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 5: Plaintiff objects to this Interrogatory to the
extent that it seeks information invasive of the attorney client privilege and work-product
doctrine. Subject to and without waiving such objections, please see the attached documents
produced concurrently with these responses.
INTERROGATORY NO. 6:

Please identify any admission or declaration against

interest you contend Allan Ward has made regarding the subject matter of this action.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 6: None at this time, Plaintiff reserves the right
to supplement this response.
INTERROGATORY NO. 7: Please identify with specificity each and every occasion

on which you contend Allan Ward breached the terms of the Settlement Agreement.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 7:

To Plaintiffs knowledge, Mr. Ward's

attorney and agent, Keith Roark, acting on Mr. Ward's behalf, breached the confidentiality
provision of the Settlement Agreement on January 9, 2017 by communicating specific details of
the Agreement to Mr. McCord Larsen. Discovery is ongoing in this matter and Plaintiff reserves
the right to supplement this response as new evidence is uncovered.
INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Please identify with specificity each and every occasion

you, or anyone acting on your behalf, communicated with McCord Larsen regarding the Lawsuit.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 8: Gary Slette communicated by phone with
McCord Larsen on a number of occasions regarding the criminal case pending against Mr. Ward.
Mr. Larsen was attempting to schedule trial dates so that Slette's clients in Texas could make
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT'S FIRST SET OF INTERROGATORIES AND REQUESTS FOR
-5PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS TO PLAINTIFF
H:\KLW\Clients\Primera Beef, LLC\Discovery\Plfs !st Resp to Defs !st Req\Plf !st Resp to Def !st Reg.doc

Page 59

arrangements to appear in Idaho to testify. Rather than calling them directly, Larsen worked
through Mr. Slette to schedule dates. At times during those discussions, the pendency of the
Lawsuit was discussed, but to Slette's knowledge, nothing substantive regarding the Lawsuit was
ever discussed with Mr. Larsen because there was nothing that the prosecutor's office could do
to affect the outcome of the Lawsuit.
INTERROGATORY NO. 9: Please identify with specificity each and every occasion

you, or anyone acting on your behalf, communicated with McCord Larsen regarding the
Settlement Agreement.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 9: During one of the occasions (precise date
unknown but presumably in early January of 2017) when Gary Slette spoke with McCord Larsen
regarding the criminal case pending against Mr. Ward, Mr. Larsen spoke about what he
perceived as mitigating factors in the criminal case. He began to recite in an almost verbatim
fashion the terms of the confidential Settlement Agreement. Gary Slette specifically asked Mr.
Larsen how it was that he had come to possess that very specific knowledge and information,
and Mr. Larsen responded that Keith Roark had provided him with a letter setting forth those
matters. Gary Slette then called Mr. Roark's office and requested a copy of the letter. Keith
Roark sent Slette an email dated January 17, 2017, and attached a copy of the letter to his email.
INTERROGATORY NO. 10: Please describe with specificity how you, or anyone

acting on your behalf, became aware of the written correspondence between Keith Roark and
McCord Larsen referenced in paragraph 8 of your Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial filed in
this matter.
ANSWER TO INTERROGATORY NO. 10: See Answer to Interrogatory No. 9 above.
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RESPONSES TO REQUESTS FOR PRODUCTION
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: Please produce copies of all documents or
exhibits which you intend to introduce into evidence at the trial of this matter.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: Plaintiff objects to this
Request for Production on the basis, and to the extent that it seeks information invasive of the
attorney client privilege and/or work-product doctrine. Plaintiff has yet to determine what
exhibits it may use at the trial of this matter but will supplement this answer when that
determination is made, or in compliance with the order governing such matters. Subject to and
without waiving such objections, please see attached documents bate stamped Primera 00001 00008.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: Please produce for inspection and/or copying
each document that contains, refers to, or relates to any admission you contend Defendant has
made regarding the subject matter of this action.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: Please see attached documents.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Please produce for inspection and/or copying
each document that contains, refers to, or relates to any declaration against interest you contend
Defendant has made regarding the subject matter of this action.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: Please see attached documents.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4:

Please produce copies of all documents

referred to, referenced and relied upon in answering any and all of the above Interrogatories.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: Please see attached documents.
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5:

Please produce each and every written

report, including all drafts of same, or other document prepared, submitted or subscribed to by
any expert retained by you to testify with regard to any matter concerning this litigation.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 5: Plaintiff has yet to determine
those individuals, if any, it may call as expert witnesses, and does not have any documentation
responsive to this request at this time but will supplement this response in compliance with the
order governing such matters. To the extent any such responsive documentation is produced in
the future, Plaintiff objects to the disclosure of draft reports as they are specifically protected
from disclosure pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(B).
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6: Please produce any and all documents which
pertain in any way to your contention that Defendant breached the terms of the Settlement
Agreement.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 6: Please see attached documents.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7:

Please produce copies of all written and

electronic communications between you, and anyone acting on your behalf, and McCord Larsen.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 7: None.
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8:

Please produce a copy of the written

correspondence referenced in paragraph 8 of the Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial filed in
this matter.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 8: Please see attached documents.
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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9: Please produce copies of all written and
electronic communications between you and Defendant relating in any way to alleged breaches
of the Settlement Agreement.
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 9: None.

th

DATED this 29 day of March, 2018.

WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP

By: - - - - - - - - - - - - - KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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VERIFICATION
ST ATE OF TEXAS

)
)ss.

County of _ _ __ )

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , being first duly sworn under oath deposes and says: I am one of the
Owners and Operator of Plaintiff in the above entitled action. I have read the within and
foregoing Answers and the contents therein are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
Dated this _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2018.

Member, Primera Beef, LLC

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me, a Notary Public for the State of Texas, this
_ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2018.

Notary Public for Texas
Residing at _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Commission expires _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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Filed: 05/04/2018 16:26:29
Fifth Judicial District, Cassia County
Joseph W Larsen, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Gunderson, Tara

DAVID T. KRUECK, ISB No. 6246
THOMAS J. LLOYD III, ISB No. 6246
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 319-2600
Facsimile: (208) 319-2601
Email: dkrueck@greenerlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,

Case No. CV-2017-290

Plaintiff,

ORDER TO SEAL THE
DECLARATION OF ALLAN WARD IN
SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.
ALLAN WARD, an individual,
Defendant.

THIS MATTER having come before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Seal the
Declaration of Allan Ward in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and good
cause appearing therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Declaration of Allan Ward in Support of
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment filed on May 3, 2018be, and hereby is, SEALED.
The Clerk of the Court is directed to take all necessary steps to seal the Declaration and prevent
public disclosure thereof.
Signed: 5/4/2018 04:25 PM

DATED this _ _ day of May, 2018.
By:

______::.?._7_
__ ~ ~

- - - - < I C . - - , ;· ; . . ~ -

Hon. Michael P. Tribe
District Judge
ORDER TO SEAL THE DECLARATION OF ALLAN WARD
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT -
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I

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

4th_ day of May, 2018 , I served a true and correct
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _
copy of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals by the method
indicated below, addressed as follows:
Kimberly L. Williams
Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP
153 East Main Street
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, ID 83338
Email: klwilliams@wmlattys.com

---

___
___
___
- -x---

David T. Krueck
Thomas J. Lloyd III

U .S. Mail
Facsimile - (208) 324-3135
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Email
iCourt E-Service

U.S. Mail
_ _ _ Facsimile - (208) 319-2601
_ _ _ Overnight Mail
_ _ _ Hand Delivery
x
- - - Email
iCourt E-Service
---

GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A.

950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, ID 83 702
Email: dkrueck@greenerlaw.com
tlloyd@greenerlaw.com

Signed: 5/4/2018 04:27 PM

Clerk(;~

ORDER TO SEAL THE DECLARATION OF ALLAN WARD
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGM ENT -
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Electronically Filed
5/17/2018 3:02 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Cassia County
Joseph W. Larsen, Clerk of the Court
By: Noemi Alanis, Deputy Clerk

KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
IDAHO STATE BAR NO. 8893
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP
Attorneys at Law
153 East Main Street
P. O. Box 168
Jerome, Idaho 83338
Telephone: (208) 324-2303
Facsimile: (208) 324-3135
klwilliams@wmlattys.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,

Case No. CV-2017-290

Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S
MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs
ALLAN WARD, an individual,
Defendant.

COMES NOW Plaintiff, PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited liability company,
by and through its attorney of record, Kimberly L. Williams, of the law firm Williams,
Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP, and submits this Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. Standard of Review
Rule 56 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that summary judgment is
proper only “if the pleadings, deposition, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” I.R.C.P. 56(c); see also Northwest Bec-Corp. v.
Home Living Serv., 136 Idaho 835, 838, 41 P.3d 263, 166 (2002). The burden is upon the
moving party to prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Petricevich v. Salmon
River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865, 868, 452 P.2d 362, 365 (1969). All controverted facts are
liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. See Tusch Enterprises v. Coffin, 113
Idaho 37 (1987).
Summary judgment is proper if the evidence before the court would warrant a
directed verdict if the case were to go to trial. Jephson v. Ambuel, 93 Idaho 790, 793, 473
P.2d 932, 935 (1970). However, the party responding to summary judgment is not required
to present evidence on every element of his or her case at that time of summary judgment, but
rather must establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding the element or elements
challenged by the moving party’s motion. See Thomson v. Idaho Ins. Agency, 126 Idaho 527,
530, 887 P.2d 1034, 1037 (1994).
II. Background
This case arises from the violation of a confidentiality clause in a Settlement
Agreement between the parties. The Defendant does not dispute that the confidentiality was
broken, but claims that the person who breached the confidentiality clause was not acting as
his agent at the time of the disclosure. Defendant also challenges the applicability of the
liquidated damages amount. Plaintiff maintains that the disclosure of the confidential
information was made by an authorized agent of Defendant and that all criteria are met to
support the liquidated damages provision.
PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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III. Argument
A.

Defendant’s agent breached the Settlement Agreement.

Mr. Roark was representing Defendant as his attorney in an ongoing criminal
proceeding at the time the disclosure was made to the Cassia County Prosecutor. See
Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment (hereinafter
“Defendant’s Memo”), page 4, Undisputed Fact #5.
“The relationship between an attorney and client is one of agency” in which
the client is the principal and the attorney is the agent.” Muncey v. Children’s
Home Finding and Aid Soc. Of Lewiston, 84 Idaho 147, 151, 369 P.2d 586,
588 (1962). An agent may bind a principal if the agent has actual authority.
Actual authority is that authority a principal expressly grants to an agent or
impliedly confers on an agent because it is usual, necessary, and proper to
achieve the object of the express authority granted to the agent. Bailey v.
Ness, 109 Idaho 495, 497, 708 P.2d 900, 902 (1985) (citing Clark v. Gneiting,
95 Idaho 10, 12, 501 P.2d 278, 280 (1972)).
Caballero v. Wilkse, 140 Idaho 329, 332, 92 P.3d 1076, 1079 (2004).
Mr. Roark’s duties naturally would include communicating with the prosecuting
attorney regarding Defendant’s criminal matter.

In fact, having representation, all

communications regarding the Defendant had to go through Mr. Roark, the prosecutor was
legally bound not to speak with Defendant directly. It was necessary to Mr. Roark’s
representation of Defendant to communicate with the prosecuting attorney’s office on
Defendant’s behalf. It was usual, necessary, and proper for Mr. Roark to communicate with
the prosecutor’s office to achieve the object of Mr. Roark’s expressly granted authority of
representing Mr. Ward in the criminal proceeding.
The January 9, 2017 letter penned by Mr. Roark indicates that he is writing in regards
to the criminal action pending against Allan Ward, and he refers to Mr. Ward as “my client”
PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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repeatedly throughout the letter. See Declaration of David T. Krueck, Ex. A. The only
purpose for the communication between Mr. Roark and the prosecuting attorney was for
representation of Mr. Ward by Mr. Roark as his legal counsel. Id. There really is no dispute
that Mr. Roark was acting in within the scope of his agency during the course of his
communications with the Cassia County prosecutor. At best, whether Mr. Roark had express
or implied authority is a question a fact. Caballero, 140 Idaho at 332-33, 92 P.3d at 1079-80
(2004).
Defendant claims that divulgence of the information contained in the Settlement
Agreement should not be held against him because it was done by his attorney. This case is
similar to the facts in Devault v. Steven L. Herndon, A Professional Ass’n., 107 Idaho 1, 684
P.2d 978 (1984) In Devault the plaintiff’s attorney had repeatedly failed to comply with
orders of the trial court and ultimately the case was dismissed for failure to comply with
those orders. The plaintiff insisted that it was his attorney who had failed to comply and that
he should not be penalized for those failures. The Devault court held “Litigants freely
choose their attorneys and cannot avoid the consequences of the attorney’s actions.” Devault
v. Steven L. Herndon, A Professional Ass’n., 107 Idaho 1, 3, 684 P.2d 978, 980 (1984)
(citations omitted).
The impropriety of Mr. Roark’s actions do not take those actions outside of the scope
of his agency, nor does it alleviate Defendant of his responsibility for the actions of his agent.
Furthermore, if those actions were so obviously improper it raised the question, why did
current counsel for Defendant also disclose the Settlement Agreement, in its entirety, by
filing the Settlement Agreement in a public manner in the course of Defendant’s current
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motion for summary judgment?
B.

The liquidated damages provision is appropriate.

Plaintiff specifically requested, and Defendant assented to the confidentiality and
liquidated damages clause which are memorialized in the Settlement Agreement. See
Declaration of Dustin Dean, ¶¶ 2-3. At the time of the Settlement Agreement, and presently,
Plaintiff is attempting to conduct business and engage in business transactions with
companies and individuals in Cassia County and the surrounding areas in Idaho. Id, ¶ 4.
Plaintiff was concerned about the impact the lawsuit and settlement would have upon its
business reputation in the local area. Id, ¶ 4. It is difficult, if not impossible, to determine
one’s monetary damages from harm done to the business reputation of a company. However,
due to the nature of Plaintiff’s business, even the loss of one transaction would be more than
$25,000. Id, ¶ 5. The amount is far from exorbitant considering the effect of possibly losing
multiple business opportunities due to harm to the business reputation of Plaintiff. The
amount is not a penalty, it applies to both parties equally, and is intended to compensate
either party for any harm done to their respective business reputations based upon a breach
of the provision of the Settlement Agreement.
The Idaho Supreme Court has stated:
Generally speaking, parties to a contract may agree upon liquidated damages
in anticipation of a breach, in any case where the circumstances are such that
accurate determination of the damages would be difficult or impossible, and
provided that the liquidated damages fixed by the contract bear a reasonable
relation to actual damages. But, where the forfeiture or damage fixed by the
contract is arbitrary and bears no reasonable relation to the anticipated
damage, and is exorbitant and unconscionable, it is regarded as a ‘penalty’,
and the contractual provision therefore is void and unenforceable.
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Graves v. Cupic, 75 Idaho 451, 454, 272 P.2d 1020, 1023 (1954).
“The burden of proving that the damages specified in the contract bear no reasonable
relation to actual damages or that the liquidated damages are exorbitant and unconscionable
rests upon the party seeking relief from the liquidated damages clause”. Magic Valley Truck
Brokers, Inc. v. Meyer, 133 Idaho 110, 117, 982 P.2d 945, 952 (1999) (citations omitted). In
this matter Defendant has offered no evidence to support its claim that the liquidated
damages clause is exorbitant or unconscionable. Defendant has provided only his opinion
that it is such.
The determinations of whether a liquidated damages provision is a penalty or is
exorbitant or unconscionable is an issue of fact and not appropriate on a motion for summary
judgment. Even if the Court is the ultimate determiner of fact regarding the issue, it does not
make such determinations on a motion for summary judgment, but does so at trial of the
matter and after considering all of the evidence. Clampitt v. A.M.R. Corp., 109 Idaho 145,
706 P.2d 34 (1985). (See also Melaleuca, Inc. v. Foeller, 155 Idaho 920, 318 P.3d 910
(2014) where the Idaho Supreme Court remanded a case determined on summary judgment
to the trial court for findings of fact on the issue of liquidated damages.)
IV. Conclusion
Defendant has failed to establish that there are no issues of fact remaining in this
case. All inferences indicate that Mr. Roark was acting within the scope of his express
authority from Defendant at the time the violation of the Settlement Agreement occurred. At
the very least there are facts tending to establish such and the matter is entirely inappropriate
for a determination on a motion for summary judgment. The enforceability of the liquidated
PLAINTIFF’S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
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damages clause is also an issue of fact and inappropriate for determination on summary
judgment. Defendant has offered no evidence that the liquidated damages provision is
unenforceable and Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied in its
entirety.
Plaintiff hereby requests that this court DENY Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment filed in this matter.
DATED this 17th day of May, 2018.

WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP

j L ~l
____________________________________
KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on May 17th, 2018, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the manner indicated
below:
David T. Krueck
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER
OBERRECHT P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, ID 83702
dkrueck@greenerlaw.com







U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivery
Facsimile to:
Email to:
Efile/Eservice

JL~)
_______________________________
KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
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Electronically Filed
5/17/2018 3:02 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Cassia County
Joseph W. Larsen, Clerk of the Court
By: Noemi Alanis, Deputy Clerk

KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
IDAHO STATE BAR NO. 8893
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP
Attorneys at Law
153 East Main Street
P. O. Box 168
Jerome, Idaho 83338
Telephone: (208) 324-2303
Facsimile: (208) 324-3135
klwilliams@wmlattys.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,

Case No. CV-2017-290

AFFIDAVIT OF GARY D. SLETTE
IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs
ALLAN WARD, an individual,
Defendant.

STATE OF IDAHO )
:ss
County of Twin Falls )

GARY D. SLETTE, being first duly sworn, deposes and says as follows:
1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the state of Idaho. I previously acted
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as counsel for the Plaintiff in a prior legal action involving the above-named parties (the
“Lawsuit”) and I make this Affidavit based upon my own personal knowledge.
2.

During my representation of the Plaintiff in the Lawsuit I had interactions with

Keith Roark, counsel for Mr. Ward, regarding the terms of the settlement of the Lawsuit which
were ultimately committed to a formal writing (“Settlement Agreement”).

I also had

communications with McCord Larsen and Doug Abenroth of the Cassia County Prosecuting
Attorney’s office. (See EXHIBIT A attached hereto.) It was during the course of those
communications that I became aware of what my clients and I regarded as a breach of the
confidentiality clause contained in the Settlement Agreement.
3.

I had communicated by phone with McCord Larsen on a number of

occasions regarding the criminal case pending against Mr. Ward. Mr. Larsen was
attempting to schedule trial dates so that the agents of Plaintiff, both of whom reside in
Texas, could make arrangements to appear in Idaho to testify. Rather than calling them
directly, Mr. Larsen chose to work through my office to schedule dates. At times during
those discussions, the pendency of the Lawsuit was discussed, but to my knowledge,
nothing substantive regarding the Lawsuit was ever discussed with Mr. Larsen because
there was nothing that the prosecutor’s office could or would do to affect the outcome of
the Lawsuit.
4.

During one of the occasions (precise date unknown but presumably in early

January of 2017) when I spoke with McCord Larsen regarding the criminal case pending
against Mr. Ward, Mr. Larsen spoke about what he perceived as mitigating factors in the
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criminal case. He began to recite in an almost verbatim fashion the terms of the confidential
Settlement Agreement. I specifically asked Mr. Larsen how it was that he had come to possess
that very specific knowledge and information, and Mr. Larsen responded that Keith Roark had
provided him with a letter setting forth those matters. I recall asking Mr. Larsen for a copy of
the letter, but he declined and suggested that I obtain it directly from Mr. Roark. Mr. Roark
has been a friend of mine for more than forty (40) years, so I called Mr. Roark's office and
requested a copy of the letter. Keith Roark sent me an email dated January 17, 2017, and
attached a copy of the letter to his email. (See EXHIBIT B attached hereto).
5.

I declare under penalty of perjury of the laws of the State of Idaho that the

foregoing statements are true and correct.
FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

DATED this J__/p_ day of May, 2018.

G~

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

I G,

day of May, 2018.

+~
1

Residing at:
Wwi (',::; / /~
My commission expires: / 2 · / f · -< 0 ~ ~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on May 17th, 2018, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the manner indicated
below:
David T. Krueck
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER
OBERRECHT P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, ID 83702
dkrueck@greenerlaw.com







U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivery
Facsimile to:
Email to:
Efile/Eservice

_______________________________
KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
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From: Doug Abenroth [mailto:dabenroth@cassiacounty.org]
Sent: Friday, September 16, 2016 2:50 PM
To: Gary Slette
Subject: RE: language

Gary:
Thank you for your correspondence on this issue regarding the criminal charge review request
against Mr. Allen Ward. The State of Idaho, by and through the Cassia County Prosecuting Attorney,
is only concerned with the criminal case, and as such, needs to know the position of the complaining
witnesses regarding the request for criminal charges. With your email stating their position, the
State is fully informed about the merits of the criminal case. The State cannot involve itself with any
potential civil resolution(s) of the issues. If you have any questions, please contact me or Deputy
Prosecutor McCord Larsen. Thank you. Have a good weekend.

Douglas G. Abenroth
Cassia County Prosecuting Attorney
1459 Overland Ave., 3 rd Floor
Post Office Box 7
Burley, Idaho 83318
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From: Keith Roark [mailto:keith@roarklaw.com]
Sent: Tuesday, January 17, 2017 4:57 PM
To: Gary Slette
Subject: Primera

Gary:
Here is a copy of my letter to McCord. You will see that I discussed those provisions of the
agreement that involved the question of deprivation in the context of 18-2403. Since your client
instigated the criminal charge (and I recognize that he was within his rights to do so) these
disclosures to the PA are not, in my view, in violation of our agreement. Let me know what you
think.
R. KEITH ROARK, ISBN 2230
THE ROARK LAW FIRM, LLP
Attorneys at Law
515 1 st Ave South
Hailey, Idaho 83333
(208) 788-2427
Fax: (208) 788-3918
keith@roarklaw.com

This message and any files attached are protected by

the Electronic Communications Privacy Act,

18 U.S.C. Sections 2510-2521 and is intended

strictly for the use of the above listed addressee and
may contain information that is PRIVILEGED AND CONFIDENTIAL. If you are not the addressee
and have received or come into possession of this email, you are hereby notified that
dissemination of this communication in any form is strictly prohibited. If you have received this
communication in error, please delete all electronic copies of this message and any attached files,
destroy any hard copies in existence, and notify R. Keith Roark immediately at (208) 788-2427 or
(208) 788 3918 (fax) or keith@roarklaw.com.
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PRIMERA 00006

THE

ROARK

HAILEY
515 SOUTH pr AVENUE
HAILEY, IDAHO83333
TEL: (208) 788-2427
FAX: (208) 788-3918

January 9, 2017

Larsen
.,_,""""~" County Prosecuting Attorney
Box 7
ID 83318

Re:

State ofIdaho vs. Alan Ward
Cassia County Case No. CV-2016-4577

Dear McCord:
I am writing in regard to the above referenced case. I feel strongly that the case should now be
dismissed because the parties have settled and I don't believe you have the evidence to prove the elements
ofa theft charge.
Mr. Ward is currently charged with taking the property (Waygu Calves and $83,000) from
Primera Beef, LLC with the intent to deprive the owner thereof of such property. Idaho Code §182402(3) defines "deprive" as:
(3) "Deprive." To "deprive" another of property means:
(a) To withhold it or cause it to be withheld from him permanently or for so extended a period or
under such circumstances that the major portion of its economic value or benefit is lost to him; or
(b) To dispose of the property in such manner or under such circumstances as to render it unlikely
that an owner will recover such property.
This case arose out of a legitimate belief on my client's part that Primera had breached its contract
with him for the purchase and sale of a number of calves, only a portion of which were the Waygu
calves. He was receiving legal advice at the time and sincerely believed that he had every legal right to
take the actions he did. After I entered both the civil and criminal cases a decision was made to proceed
in a different manner in order to get the matter resolved and move on.
Not only did my client not intend to deprive Primera Beef, LLC of its property, no such
deprivation took place. In point of fact, the parties arrived at and have fully executed a complete
settlement and release of all outstanding claims. fudeed, Mr. Ward actually enhanced the economic value
of the property returned to Primera Beef agreeing to pay 1) $15,000 in attorney fees, 2) $500 per head for
every calf that died during the time between July 15 and November 10, 2016 3) $500 per head for each
and every calfrejected by Primera's veterinarian for sickness, lameness or disease. Furthermore, my

WWW.ROARKLAW,COM
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client fed the calves during the entire period of time, thus relieving Primera of thousands of dollars in feed
cost. Had Mr. Ward not held the calves, Primera would have been required to stand the mortality losses,
sickness and disease losses and feed the calves for the July 15 to November 10 period. You, as a
stockman yourself, understand what the cost of feeding nearly 170 calves for four months amounts
to. Since the calves will not be harvested until they are approximately 2 years old, more than 20% of the
feed costs to get them there was borne by Mr. Ward to the benefit of Primera.

I am not disputing or criticizing your initial decision to charge in this case. I am simply looldng at
the elements you are required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt and pointing out that you probably
won't get this case past preliminary hearing, and if you do you very likely won't survive a Rule 29
motion after your case in chief and certainly will not prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial that Alan
Ward intended to deprive and/or did deprive Primera of the Waygu calves or their value.

I am sure you and your office have many, many important and provable cases that you are
working on now and will see many more such cases throughout this coming year. I see no interest your
office, the taxpayers of Cassia County, or Primera Beef have in proceeding any further with a case that
has been settled, civilly, in its entirety.
I hope to hear from you soon.
Sincerely,

RKR:cjl
cc: Client
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Electronically Filed
5/17/2018 3:02 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Cassia County
Joseph W. Larsen, Clerk of the Court
By: Noemi Alanis, Deputy Clerk

KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
IDAHO STATE BAR NO. 8893
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP
Attorneys at Law
153 East Main Street
P. O. Box 168
Jerome, Idaho 83338
Telephone: (208) 324-2303
Facsimile: (208) 324-3135
klwilliams@wmlattys.com
Attorneys for Plaintiff

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,

Case No. CV-2017-290

Plaintiff,

DECLARATION OF
DUSTIN DEAN IN OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs
ALLAN WARD, an individual,
Defendant.

DUSTIN DEAN states as follows:
1.

I am an owner and agent of the Plaintiff in this action, I am over the age of 18

years, and I make this Declaration based upon my own personal knowledge.
2.

I was the agent of Plaintiff in a prior lawsuit with Defendant Allan Ward (the

“Lawsuit”). I personally participated in the settlement negotiations for the Lawsuit, the terms

DECLARATION OF DUSTIN DEAN IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT - 1 H:\KLW\Clients\Primera Beef, LLC\Pleadings\Defs MSJ\Declaration (client) - MSJ.doc
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of which were subsequently memorialized in a written document ("Settlement Agreement").
3.

The confidentiality, non-disparagement and liquidated damages portion of the

Settlement Agreement was specifically requested by my attorney as part of the settlement of the
Lawsuit.
4.

Plaintiff continues to seek business opportunities in Cassia County and the

surrounding areas in Idaho. We were concerned about the impact of the Lawsuit and its outcome
upon the business reputation of Plaintiff.
5.

While it is not possible to specifically determine what losses would be associated

with damage to Plaintiffs business reputation, the loss of even one potential business transaction
would result in more than a $25,000 loss to Plaintiff.
6.

I declare under penalty of perjury of the laws of the State of Idaho that the

foregoing statements are true and correct.
DATED this/

7 day of May, 2018.

o~{l__

Dustin Dean

DECLARATION OF DUSTIN DEAN IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT' S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT - 2 Macintosh HD: Users:dustindean:Downloads:Declaration (client) - MSJ.doc
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on May 17th, 2018, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the manner indicated
below:
David T. Krueck
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER
OBERRECHT P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, ID 83702
dkrueck@greenerlaw.com







U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivery
Facsimile to:
Email to:
Efile/Eservice

_______________________________
KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
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COUNTERCLAIM WITH PREJUDICE
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ORDER FOR DISMISSAL OF COUNTERCLAIM WITH PREJUDICE - 1

Hon. Michael P. Tribe
District Judge

DATED this ____ day of _________, 2018.

Signed: 5/17/2018 05:16 PM

costs or attorneys’ fees to any party as against the other insofar as the Counterclaim is concerned.

Defendant Allan Ward is hereby dismissed in its entirety with prejudice, and without an award of

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Counterclaim of

by Defendant Allan Ward on or about April 24, 2017, and there appearing good cause therefore,

Counterclaim With Prejudice of the parties for dismissal of the Counterclaim in this matter filed

This matter having come before the Court on the Stipulation for Dismissal of

Defendant.

ALLAN WARD, an individual,

vs.

Plaintiff,

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

Attorneys for Defendant

DAVID T. KRUECK, ISB No. 6246
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 319-2600
Facsimile: (208) 319-2601
Email: dkrueck@greenerlaw.com

Filed: 05/21/2018 13:28:39
Fifth Judicial District, Cassia County
Joseph W Larsen, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Forthun, Theresa

.

\'\

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _____
21st day of May, 2018, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals by the method
indicated below, addressed as follows:
Kimberly L. Williams
Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP
153 East Main Street
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, ID 83338
Email: klwilliams@wmlattys.com

✓

David T. Krueck
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, ID 83702
Email: dkrueck@greenerlaw.com

✓

U.S. Mail
Facsimile – (208) 324-3135
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Email
iCourt E-Service

U.S. Mail
Facsimile – (208) 319-2601
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Email
iCourt E-Service

Clerk - T. Forthun
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Electronically Filed
5/24/2018 4:18 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Cassia County
Joseph W. Larsen, Clerk of the Court
By: Noemi Alanis, Deputy Clerk

DA YID T. KRUECK, ISB No. 6246
THOMAS J. LLOYD III, ISB No. 7772
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, ID 83702
Telephone: (208) 319-2600
Facsimile: (208) 319-2601
Email: dkrueck@greenerlaw.com
tlloyd@greenerlaw.com
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

Case No. CV-2017-290

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
ALLAN WARD, an individual,
Defendant.

COMES NOW Defendant Allan Ward ("Ward"), by and through his counsel of record
David T. Krueck and Thomas J. Lloyd III of the firm GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT
P.A., and hereby respectfully submits this Reply Memorandum in Support of his Motion for
Summary Judgment

I.

INTRODUCTION

Defendant Primera Beef, LLC ("Primera") concedes that Ward did not personally breach the
terms of the Settlement Agreement and Mutual Release ("Agreement") at issue in this matter.
Primera relies exclusively on its theory of implied authority to hold Ward liable for the written
disclosure of certain terms in the Agreement by his attorney, Keith Roark. Primera, however, fails

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-
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I

to present the Court with any facts to support its opposition to Ward's motion. Primera's legal
argument is contradictory to the extent that it contends Roark's actions were "usual necessary, and
proper" to achieve the object of representing Ward's interests in the criminal proceedings while also
claiming Roark's actions constitute a breach of the Agreement.
Primera argues the liquidated damages provision was negotiated and included to protect its
business reputation from being harmed by Ward. Primera does not articulate how a breach of the
confidentiality terms in the Agreement would harm its business reputation.

Instead, Primera

conflates an alleged breach of the confidentiality provision of the Agreement into a violation of the
non-disparagement clause to support enforcement of liquidated damages against Ward. Primera has
failed to demonstrate how liquidated damages in the amount of $25,000.00 for disclosing the terms
of the Agreement bears any reasonable relationship to actual damages Primera might suffer from
such a breach.

II.
A.

ARGUMENT

Mr. Roark Did Not Have Authority to Improperly Disclose the Terms of the
Agreement as an Agent of Ward.

Primera relies on Caballero v. Wikse , 140 Idaho 329, 92 P.3d 1076 (2004), to define the
scope of the implied authority an attorney has an agent of his or her client when representing the
client's interests.

Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary

Judgment ("Primera Opposition"), p. 3. Primera argues "[i]t was usual, necessary, and proper for
Mr. Roark to communicate with the prosecutor's office to achieve the object of Mr. Roark's
expressly granted authority of representing Mr. Ward in the criminal proceeding." Id.

Primera

mistakenly asserts that violating the Agreement is within Mr. Roark's implied authority as Ward' s
attorney and agent.

REPLY MEMORANDUM rN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-2
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Primera cites Devault v. Steven L. Herndon, A Professional Ass 'n, 107 Idaho 1, 864 P.2d
978 (1984), to support its contention that Ward is liable for the disclosure of the terms of the
Agreement by Mr. Roark to the prosecuting attorney's office. Id. at 4. The Devault decision is
clearly distinguishable from the case at bar. In Devault, the attorney failed to comply with Court
orders regarding discovery, which led to the dismissal of the client's lawsuit as a sanction for the
violation. The client asserted that it should not suffer the harsh sanction of dismissal of the action as
a result of the action/inaction of its legal counsel. Id. at 5-6. The Supreme Court upheld the trial
court's order of dismissal under the broad discretion granted to the trial court to issue sanctions for
violations of the trial court's discovery orders under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b). Here,
Mr. Roark's actions do not invoke Ward's duties under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure as a

party to a civil action, but instead involve an alleged breach of contract. Primera is not attempting
to sanction Ward for his attorney's failure to abide by the Rules of Civil Procedure or some other
rule or statute that would impliedly be required by his legal counsel. Rather, this case involves an
alleged breach of contract by Ward's attorney for actions Ward did not know of or authorize.
Declaration of Allan Ward in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment ("Ward
Dec."), ,, 8 and 9.
Ward certainly would have expected Mr. Roark to diligently represent his interests in the
criminal proceedings against him. Ward could reasonably expect that this diligent representation
would include occasional communications Mr. Roark would have with the prosecutor's office
regarding Ward's case, including telephone conversations and written correspondence.

Ward,

however, did not, and would not, authorize Mr. Roark to breach the Agreement with Primera when
Mr. Roark communicated with the prosecutor's office. Ward's position is strengthened by the fact

that Mr. Roark also represented Ward in the civil case with Primera, negotiated the terms of the
Agreement to settle that case (which includes a confidentiality provision), and Mr. Roark signed the
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 3
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Agreement in November 2016 before he sent his letter to the prosecuting attorney on
January 9, 2017. Simply stated, Ward did not hire Mr. Roark to breach the Agreement Mr. Roark
negotiated on Ward's behalf less than two months before disclosing the settlement terms to the
prosecuting attorney's office.
Primera argues Mr. Roark's disclosure of the terms of the Agreement are improper, yet still
argues the Court should find that Mr. Roark was acting within the implied scope of his express
authority. Primera's Opposition, p. 4. This argument is contradictory, and should be rejected by the
Court. It is axiomatic that in order for the agent' s actions to be "usual, necessary, and proper to
achieve the object of the express authority granted to the agent" the subject actions cannot also be
deemed improper by the very party attempting to hold the principal liable. 1
Finally, Primera asserts that whether Mr. Roark was acting within his express or implied
authority is a question of fact. Primera's Opposition, p. 4. Primera, however, does not identify
or articulate what evidence gives rise to a question of fact on this issue.

Ward clearly and

unequivocally alleges in his Declaration that he did not authorize or have any knowledge that

Mr. Roark intended to send a letter to the prosecuting attorney, or anyone else, disclosing the
terms of the Agreement. Ward Dec.,

,r,r

8 and 11. Primera has failed to present any facts to

refute this evidence or to create a genuine issue of material fact to define the implied scope of
Mr. Roark's authority as Ward's attorney in the criminal proceedings. To defeat a motion for
summary judgment "the nonmoving party's case must consist of more than speculation." Ryan v.
Beisner, 123 Idaho 42, 45, 844 P.2d 24, 25 (Ct. App. 1992).

The material facts pertinent to Ward' s motion are not in dispute. Ward did not disclose any
of the terms of the Agreement. Mr. Roark was Ward's attorney in both the underlying lawsuit filed

Primera argues "[t]he impropriety of Mr. Roark' s actions do not take those actions out of the scope of hi s
agency, nor does it alleviate [Ward] of his responsibility for the actions of his agent." Primera's Opposition, p. 4.
1
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by Primera and the criminal proceedings filed by the Cassia County Prosecutor's Office. Ward did
not authorize Mr. Roark to disclose the terms of the Agreement in conjunction with the criminal
case, nor was Ward aware that Mr. Roark intended to so. Primera's entire breach of contract case is
based on the actions of Mr. Roark, not Ward, which necessarily means the alleged actions of
Mr. Roark constituted an improper breach of the Agreement. There is no evidence whatsoever

offered by Primera that Ward granted express or implied authority to Mr. Roark to breach the
Agreement by disclosing the terms of the Agreement in the course and scope of Mr. Roark's
representation of Ward. The Court should, therefore, dismiss the breach of contract claim against
Ward as a matter oflaw.

B.

The Liquidated Damages Clause Is Unenforceable as a Matter of Law.

Primera relies on the Declaration of Dustin Dean to argue damages to Primera's business
reputation allegedly caused by the outcome of the underlying lawsuit were difficult or impossible to
calculate when the Agreement was negotiated. Primera's Opposition, p. 5; Declaration of Dustin
Dean in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, ,r,r 3-5. Primera, however, fails
to articulate what actual damages it might suffer from a breach of the confidentiality provisions, as
opposed to a breach of the non-disparagement terms of the Agreement.
Ward will concede that damages for loss of business resulting from one of the parties
making disparaging, negative, or derogatory comments about the other would be difficult or
impossible to prove. Consequently, liquidated damages for a breach of these terms is appropriate,
and the amount of $25,000.00 is a reasonable substitution for said damages, as set forth in the
Agreement. Ward, however, does not agree that the liquidated damages represent any relationship
to actual damages either party might suffer from disclosure of the terms of the Agreement. Ward
also does not recall this matter being discussed or contemplated during the negotiation of the written
Agreement. Ward Dec., ,r,r 12 and 13.
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Primera makes a conclusory argument that its business reputation might be harmed if the
terms of the Agreement are improperly disclosed. Primera, however, does not make any attempt to
present the Court with an argument of what actual damages, if any, it would suffer from this breach.
In order for the Court to enforce a liquidated damages clause, the parties must have made some
reasonable effort to determine what compensation would be available in the event of a breach, prior
to agreeing to liquidated damages. Schroeder v. Partin, 151 Idaho 471 , 259 P.3d 617 (2011). Ward
respectfully submits that no actual damages were considered or exist in this case for a breach of the
confidentiality clause in the Agreement. The Court should, therefore, find the liquidated damages
provision unenforceable as a matter of law.

III.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court should enter summary judgment in favor of Ward,
dismissing Primera' s breach of contract cause of action.

Alternatively, if the Court allows the

breach of contract claim to proceed to trial, the Court should find that the liquidated damages
provision of the Agreement is unenforceable, and require Primera to prove actual damages caused
by the alleged breach.
DATED this 24 th day of May, 2018 .
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER OBERRECHT P.A.

David T. Krueck, Of the Firm
Thomas J. Lloyd III
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 24 th day of May, 2018, I served a true and correct copy
of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals by the method
indicated below, addressed as follows:
Kimberly L. Williams
Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP
153 East Main Street
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, ID 83338
Email : klwilliams@wmlattys.com

__
___
___
___

U.S.Mail
Facsimile - (208) 324-3135
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
- - - Email
-x
- - iCourt E-Service

~

David T. Krueck
Thomas J. Lloyd III
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
th
THE 5 JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASSIA COUNTY , IDAHO
ON: 7/20/201 8 05:01 PM
JOSEPH W. LARSEN
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

Filed By: tg

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
Liability company,

Case No. CV-2017-290

Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FORSU MMAR YJUDG MENT

vs.
ALLAN WARD, an individual
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Primera Beef, LLC ("Primera") filed their Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on
March 13, 201 7, alleging a single cause of action against Allan Ward ("Ward") for breach
of a
confidentiality term of a settlement agreement ("Agreement"). Ward filed an answer
and a
counterclaim on April 24, 2017 and a motion for summary judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P.
56 on
May 3, 2018. On stipulation of both parties, the Court dismissed Ward's counterclaim
with
prejudice on May 21, 2018. The Court heard oral argument on Ward's summary judgme
nt
motion on June 1, 2018. The matter was taken under advisement and deemed fully submitte
d on
that date. For the following reasons, Ward's motion is GRANTED.
MEMORA NDUM DECISION GRANTIN G DEFENDA NT'S MOTION FOR SUMMAR
Y JUDGMEN T
CV-2017-290
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UNDISPUTED FACTS
Based on the pleadings, the following facts are undisputed for the purposes of Ward's
motion:
In November 2016, the parties and their attorneys executed the Agreement in conjunction
with prior litigation in Cassia County Case no. CV-2016-859 ("the underlying lawsuit"). Deel. of
Allan Ward in Sup. of Def's. Mot. for Sum. Jud. ("Ward Deel."), Ex. A. For Primera, the
Agreement was executed by Dustin Dean and by its attorney Gary D. Slette. Id. For Ward and
Little Moo Cattle Company, the Agreement was executed by Ward and his attorney R. Keith
Roark ("Mr. Roark"). Id. The Agreement included a confidentiality clause, combined with a
non-disparagement clause. Id. The Agreement states, "[ e]xcept as otherwise required by this
Agreement, law, or order of a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties shall keep the terms of
this Agreement strictly confidential." Id. at ,i 6. In addition, a liquidated damage provision was
included for a breach of the Agreement. Compl. & Demand for Jury Trial ("Compl.") at ,i 7. The
Agreement was entered into on or about November 10, 2016. Ward Deel. at ,i 5. The underlying
lawsuit was dismissed on November 16, 2016. Id. at ,i 7.
Ward continued to engage Mr. Roark as his attorney to defend him in a related criminal
matter then pending in Cassia County after the execution of the Agreement.

Following the

dismissal of the underlying lawsuit, Ward inquired "with my counsel, R. Keith Roark, whether it
would be possible to also have the criminal matter dismissed." Ward Deel. at

,r 8.

Mr. Roark

drafted and sent a letter dated January 9, 2017, to a deputy Cassia County Prosecutor in an effort
to resolve the criminal matter. Aff. of Gary D. Slette in Opp. to Def's. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B.
In the January 9 th letter, Mr. Roark notified the deputy prosecutor of the settlement in the
underlying lawsuit. Primera's claim for breach of the Agreement is based upon the January 9 th

MEMORAND UM DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANT 'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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letter. Compl. at ,r 11. Ward maintains that he did not direct, authorize or review the letter prior
to Mr. Roark sending the letter.

LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment.

A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense, or the part
of each claim or defense on which summary judgment is sought. The court must grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56.
The nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of
material fact exists to establish a genuine issue." Northwest. Bee-Corp v. Home Living Serv., 136
Idaho 835, 838, 41 P.3d 263, 266 (2002). Accordingly, "[t]he moving party is entitled to
judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial." Lincoln Land Co., LLC v. LP Broadband, Inc., 163 Idaho 105, 408 P.3d 465, 468-69
(2017).
When the party moving for summary judgment will not carry the burden of production or
proof at trial, the "genuine issue of material fact" burden may be met by establishing the absence
of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. Once such
an absence of evidence has been established, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the
motion to establish, via further depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, that there is indeed
a genuine issue for trial, or to offer a valid justification for the failure to do so under I.R.C.P.
56(f). Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist., 125 Idaho 872,874,876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.1994).
When considering whether the evidence in the record shows that there is no
genuine issue of material fact, the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and
MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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draw all reasonable inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party." Therefore, "[i]f
there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over
which this Court exercises free review" (citations omitted). Budget Truck Sales, LLC v. Tilley, 163 Idaho 841, 419 P .3d 1139, 1144 (2018).
B. Authority

The

three

types

of

agencies

are

express authority,

implied authority,

and

apparent authority. A principal creates agency when he:
(1) [E]xpressly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions on his or her
behalf; (2) impliedly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions which
are necessary to complete those actions that were expressly authorized; or (3)
apparently grants the agent authority to act through conduct towards a third party
indicating that express or implied authority has been granted.

Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Family Prop. Owners' Ass'n, Inc., 162 Idaho 317, 330, 396 P.3d

1199, 1212 (2017) (quotingHumphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728, 735, 366 P.3d 1088, 1095
(2016)); Fischer v. Croston, 163 Idaho 331,413 P.3d 731, 737-38 (2018).
C. Breach of Contract

"The elements for a claim for breach of contract are: (a) the existence of the contract, (b)
the breach of the contract, (c) the breach caused damages, and (d) the amount of those damages."
Mosel! Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., 154 Idaho 269,278,297 P.3d 232,241 (2013); Path to
Health, LLP v. Long, 161 Idaho 50, 57,383 P.3d 1220, 1227 (2016).
DISCUSSION

The single question this Court is required to answer is: Did Mr. Roark have authority to
disclose the terms· of the Agreement in an attempt to settle the criminal matter? The parties do
not disagree that Mr. Roark was representing Ward as his attorney in the criminal proceeding at
the time the Agreement was disclosed to the deputy prosecutor. Pl' s Mem. in Opp. to Def' s Mot.
for Summ. J. ("Pl's Mem.") at 3; Defs Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Sumrn. J. at 4. ("Defs.
Mem."). The parties do not contend that Ward personally breached the terms of the Agreement.
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Def s. Reply Mern. in Supp. of Def s. Mot. for Surnm. J. at I. Liability can only attach to Ward
through a finding that his agent, Mr. Roark, had at least one of the three types of authority to act
recognized in Idaho law.
A. Express Authority

Express authority refers to that authority which the principal has explicitly granted the
agent to act in the principal's name. Muniz v. Schrader, 115 Idaho 497, 500, 767 P.2d 1272, 1275
(Ct.App.1989). Ward unequivocally states he neither authorized nor even knew that Mr. Roark
had intended to disclose the terms of his settlement with Primera to the Cassia County deputy
prosecutor. Ward Deel. at

,r,r

8-9. That statement has not been contradicted or rebutted by

anything in the record. In the absence of evidence regarding express authority which Primera
has the burden of proof at trial, there is, therefore, no genuine dispute of material fact as to Mr.
Roark lacking express authority from Ward to disclose the terms of the Agreement to a third
party.
B. Apparent Authority

Apparent authority differs from express and implied authority in that it is not based on
the words and conduct of the principal toward the agent, but on the principal' s words and
conduct toward the third party. Apparent authority may be found when a principal voluntarily
places an agent in such a position that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with the
business usages and the nature of a particular business, is justified in believing that the agent is
acting pursuant to existing authority. Tri-Circle, Inc. v. Brugger Corp~, 121 Idaho 950, 955, 829
P .2d 540, 545 (Ct. App. 1992). "Consequently, apparent authority cannot arise from the acts and
statements of the agent alone; it must be based upon the principal's words and conduct." Landvik
by Landvik v. Herbert, 130 Idaho 54, 59, 936 P.2d 697, 702 (Ct.App.1997).
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Based upon the pleadings, motions, affidavits, declarations and exhibits on file in this
case there is an absence of evidence that Ward made any statement or that his conduct would
communicate to any party that Mr. Roark was authorized to disclose the prohibited Agreement
terms on his behalf. The mere fact that Mr. Roark was retained as Ward's attorney in both
matters does not, on its own, rise to the level of apparent authority to attribute the breach of the
confidential provisions of the Agreement to Ward. Ward could expect Mr. Roark to attempt to
settle the criminal matter and in fact he asked Mr. Roark if the criminal could be resolved. Ward
Deel. at

,r 8.

However, there is nothing in the record indicating that Ward authorized disclosure

of the barred provisions of the Agreement. In fact, Ward specifically states he did not "ask or
authorize [Mr. Roark] to disclose any of the terms of the settlement to the Prosecuting Attorney
for Cassia County" Id. Primera has not contradicted that sworn declaration by way of affidavit
or declaration. The doctrine of apparent authority is inapplicable to the facts as presented and
provides no basis for permitting Primera's claims of agency liability.
C. Implied Authority

Implied authority refers to that authority "which is necessary, usual, and proper to
accomplish or perform" the express authority delegated to the agent by the principal. Clark v.
Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10, 12,501 P.2d 278,280 (1972).
It is not disputed that Ward retained Mr. Roark to defend him in the criminal action.

Ward Deel. at

,r 8.

It is also not disputed that Ward did not give him the express authority to

divulge the confidentiality provisions of the Agreement. Id. Simply because Mr. Roark had been
retained and had express authority to represent Ward in the criminal proceedings cannot lead to
the legal conclusion that any action taken by Mr. Roark to settle that matter fell within the scope
of that express representation or that there was implied authority to take action that could lead to
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liability for Ward under the Agreement. Instead, Primera must prove that the disclosure of the
confidential terms of the Agreement was "necessary, usual, and proper" in the performance of
Mr. Roark's duties as Ward's criminal attorney, in order for an action to be maintained under the
theory of implied authority. The Court cannot make such a finding as there is an absence of
evidence that such action was necessary, usual, and proper.
Primera asserts that whether Mr. Roark was acting within his express or implied authority
is a question of fact. Pl's Mem. at 4. However, Primera fails to identify what evidence gives rise
to a question of fact on this issue. Ward states in his declaration that he did not authorize Mr.
Roark nor did he have any advanced knowledge that Mr. Roark intended to send a letter to the
deputy prosecutor disclosing the terms of the Agreement. Ward. Deel. at

,r,r 8 and

11. Primera

has not presented any facts to refute this declaration or to create a genuine issue of material fact
to explain or define the implied scope of Mr. Roark's authority as Ward's attorney in the
criminal proceeding.
As argued by Ward, "[i]f as Primera complains, the disclosure of the terms of the
Settlement Agreement was improper (i.e. a breach of the Agreement), then Mr. Roark's conduct
in allegedly doing so could not be 'necessary, usual, and proper."' Def s. Mem. at 7. The Court
cannot find that it was "necessary, usual, and proper" for Mr. Roark to disclose confidential
terms of a civil settlement agreement to diligently and fully represent the same client in a
separate criminal case after having been aware of and participated in the settlement negotiations,
which resolved the civil matter.
ORDER

Based on the foregoing, there is no genuine dispute that Ward personally breached the
terms of the Agreement. In addition, there is an absence of evidence and therefore no disputed
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fact that Ward never expressly authorized Mr. Roark to disclose the Agreement to a third party
nor are there any "words or conduct" by Ward that give rise to apparent authority for Mr.
Roark's actions.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that the disclosure of the confidential

portions of the Agreement were "necessary, usual, and proper" for the resolution of the criminal
case and that Mr. Roark had implied authority to divulge the confidential portions of the
Agreement. Finally, Primera has not produced additional material to establish a disputed issue of
material fact regarding the theories of agency. Therefore, Ward's motion for summary judgment
is GRANTED and it is unnecessary for the Court to rule as to liquid damages provision .

It is so ORDERED this

/(. \r-.

2U

day of July, 2018.

//;Y?/~
MICHAEL P. TRIBE
District Judge

MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
CV-2017-290

Page 102

y·;zc

Page 8

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

lo,

I hereby certify that on July
2018 I caused to be served a true and correct copy of
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P. O. Box 168
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,

Case No. CV-2017-290

Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

vs
ALLAN WARD, an individual,
Defendant.

COMES NOW Plaintiff, PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited liability company,
by and through its attorney of record, Kimberly L. Williams, of the law firm Williams,
Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP, and moves the above-named court, pursuant to Idaho Rule of
Civil Procedure 11.2(b), for reconsideration of the court’s Memorandum Decision Granting
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment entered on July 20th, 2018.
This Motion is supported by the Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration filed concurrently herewith, and the court record on file in this matter.
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Plaintiff requests oral argument on this Motion.
DATED this 21st day of August, 2018.

WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP

____________________________________
KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
Attorneys for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on August 21st, 2018, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the manner indicated
below:
David T. Krueck
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER
OBERRECHT P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, ID 83702
dkrueck@greenerlaw.com
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_______________________________
KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,

Case No. CV-2017-290

Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

vs
ALLAN WARD, an individual,
Defendant.

COMES NOW Plaintiff, PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited liability company,
by and through its attorney of record, Kimberly L. Williams, of the law firm Williams,
Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP, and hereby submits its Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s
Motion for Reconsideration.
I. Introduction
Defendant Allan Ward (“Ward”) filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to
I.R.C.P. 56 May 3, 2018.

This Court entered its Memorandum Decision Granting

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgement on July 20, 2018. Plaintiff respectfully moves
this Court to reconsider its decision in light of certain additional case law discussed below.
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II. Argument

A.

Legal Standards for Motions for Reconsideration.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(2)(B) expressly provides that a party may
file a motion for reconsideration at any time prior to the entry of final judgment, but no
later than fourteen (14) days after the entry of final judgment. As no entry of final
judgment has been entered this motion is timely. The decision to grant or deny a motion
for reconsideration is subject to the discretion of the trial court. Johnson v. Lambros, 143
Idaho 468, 147 P.3d 100, 105 (Ct. App. 2006).

When presenting a motion for

reconsideration pursuant to Id. R. Civ. P. 11(a)(2)(B) a party may, but is not required, to
present new evidence. Johnson, 147 P.3d at 104. A trial court may reconsider its opinion
for both errors of fact or errors of law. See Johnson, 147 P.3d at 104.
B.

The Attorney is the Agent of the Client.

“‘The relationship between an attorney and his client is one of agency’ in which the
client is the principal and the attorney is the agent.” Caballero v. Wilkse, 140 Idaho 329, 332,
92 P.3d 1076, 1079 (2004) (quoting Munsey v. Children’s Home Finding and Aid Soc. of
Lewiston, 84 Idaho 147, 151, 369 P.2d 586, 588(1962)). Idaho Civil Jury Instructions 6.40.1
defines Agency as follows: “The term ‘agent’ refers to a person authorized by another, called
the ‘principal,’ to act for or in the place of the principal. The principal is responsible for any
act of the agent with the agent’s scope of authority.”
The Idaho Civil Jury Instructions also provide a definition for the scope of authority.
“Conduct is within the scope of the agent’s authority if it occurs while the agent is engaged
in the duties that the agent was asked or expected to perform and relates to those duties.” IDJI
6.43.1. In this present matter Mr. Roark was communicating with the deputy prosecutor as
part of his express duty to represent Ward in the criminal action, and those communications
related to that duty.
“It is not necessary that a particular act or failure to act be expressly authorized
by the principal to bring it within the scope of the agent’s authority. Conduct for the
benefit of the principal that is incidental to, customarily connect with, or reasonably
necessary for the performance of such duties is within the scope of the agent’s authority.” Id.
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(citing Landvik v. Herbert, 130 Idaho 54, 936 P.2d 697, 702, (Idaho App. 1997), emphasis
added). Again, this language is directly in line with the present matter. Ward did not directly
oversee every statement made by Mr. Roark, but gave him express authority to participate in
the communications themselves. Mr. Roark derived no personal benefit from the
communications and his conduct was for the benefit of Ward and Ward alone.
“The statements of an agent respecting the subject matter of an action and within the
scope of his authority are binding on the principal.” Thornton v. Budge, 74 Idaho 103, 257
P.2d 238 (1953). In Thornton, the Idaho Supreme Court held that a passenger in an
automobile was the principal of the driver where the driver was taking the passenger on a
business errand for the passenger. The driver in Thornton negligently caused an automobile
accident and the passenger was held liable for the damages caused by the automobile
accident. Id. The Court further found that the principal was bound by the statements made
by the driver at the scene of the accident as the passenger’s principal. Thornton, 74 Idaho at
108, 257 P.2d at 241.
Clearly operating a vehicle in a negligent manner is improper, but it does not excuse
the principal from responsibility for that improper act as it remains within the scope of the
authority. Similarly, one does not stand over the shoulder of their attorney dictating what the
attorney writes, but simply authorizes the attorney to so communicate on their behalf. If the
attorney subsequently makes a negligent or improper statement in the course of fulfilling his
duty to communicate on behalf of the client, the client is still responsible for the actions of
his attorney as his agent.
“Litigants freely choose their attorneys and cannot avoid the consequences of the
attorney’s actions.” Devault v. Steven L. Herndon, A Professional Ass’n., 107 Idaho 1, 3, 684
P.2d 978, 980 (1984) (citations omitted). In Devault the attorney repeatedly failed to comply
with orders from the court, resulting in a delay of trial and ultimately the dismissal of the
action altogether. Those actions on the part of Devault’s attorney were clearly improper.
However, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, stating that Devault could not
avoid the consequences of his attorney’s action. Similarly, in the present matter, Mr.
Roark’s improper action does not take his actions outside of the scope of his authority.
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III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff requests the court reconsider its Memorandum
Decision Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff requests the court
Deny the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this 21st day of August, 2018.
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP

______________________________________
KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
Case No. CV-2017-290

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION

vs.
ALLAN WARD, an individual,
Defendant.

COMES NOW Defendant Allan Ward, by and through his counsel of record
David T. Krueck of the firm ELAM & BURKE, P.A., and hereby submits this Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.
I.

INTRODUCTION

As the Court is aware, this case involves an alleged breach of the Settlement Agreement
between Allan Ward (“Ward”) and Primera Beef, LLC (“Primera”) relating to communications
between Ward’s prior attorney, Keith Roark, and the County Prosecutor. Primera’s case against
Ward is exclusively based on the communications of Mr. Roark to the County Prosecutor, and
there is no evidence in the record of any breach by Ward himself. Consequently, Primera carries
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the burden of proof to show that Ward is liable for the actions of Mr. Roark while Mr. Roark was
acting as Ward’s agent. Ward filed a motion for summary judgment, and oral argument was
conducted on June 1, 2018. The Court issued its Memorandum Decision Granting Defendant’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (“Order”) on July 20, 2018.
Primera argued in its opposition to Ward’s summary judgment motion that Mr. Roark had
implied authority to disclose the confidential terms of the Settlement Agreement.

Ward

responded to this argument by directing the Court’s attention to the established law in Idaho
regarding the limits of an agent’s implied authority – that “which is necessary, usual, and proper
to accomplish or perform the express authority delegated to the agent by the principal.”
(Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 6.)
In its Order, the Court already considered Primera’s argument, and properly ruled that
Mr. Roark’s communications with the County Prosecutor which allegedly breached the
confidentiality terms of the Settlement Agreement could not be “necessary, usual, and proper.”
(Order, p. 7).
The Court’s reasoning and analysis regarding the application of Idaho agency law are
sound. Primera’s argument and reliance on the Idaho Civil Jury Instructions do not provide any
justifiable basis to overturn the Order. Primera has failed to present any new law or authority to
demonstrate any error of law in the Order. The Court should, therefore, deny Primera’s motion
for reconsideration.
II.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11.2(b), which contemplates motions to reconsider,
provides in pertinent part: “A motion to reconsider any order of the trial court entered before
final judgment may be made at any time prior to or within 14 days after the entry of a final
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judgment.” I.R.C.P. 11.2(b).1 “A decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration generally
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court.” Spur Prod. Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 143 Idaho
812, 817, 153 P.3d 1158, 1163 (2007). Abuse of discretion is determined by a three-part test,
which asks whether the district court “(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
acted

within

the

outer

boundaries

of

its

discretion

and

consistently

with

the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) reached its decision
by an exercise of reason.” Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho
761, 765, 86 P.3d 475, 479 (2004) (citations omitted).
III.

ANALYSIS

The definition for the scope of an agent’s authority set forth in IDJI 6.43.1 does not provide
any basis for reconsideration because the definition is consistent with the authorities relied upon by
the Court in its Order. The portion of the pattern Jury Instruction relied upon by Primera supports
the Court’s Order. Mr. Roark’s communication with the County Prosecutor was not “[c]onduct for
the benefit of the principal that is incidental to, customarily connected with, or reasonably necessary
for the performance of such duties within the scope of the agent’s authority.” (IDJI 6.43.1). There
is no disputed issue of fact that Mr. Roark did not have express authority from Ward to
communicate the confidential terms of the Settlement Agreement to any third parties. Mr. Roark
was not retained by Ward to breach the terms of the Settlement Agreement Mr. Roark heled
negotiate and draft on Ward’s behalf. Nor did Mr. Roark’s letter to the County Prosecutor benefit
Ward in any manner. To the contrary, Ward was sued by Primera as a result of Mr. Roark’s letter.
The Court correctly concluded that it was not “‘necessary, usual, and proper’ for Mr. Roark
to disclose confidential terms of a civil settlement agreement to diligently and fully represent the

1

Primera cites to I.R.C.P. 11(a)(2)(B), which is substantially similar to the current Rule 11.2(b) for
motions to reconsider.
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same client in a separate criminal case after having been made aware of and participated in the
settlement negotiations, which resolved the civil matter.” (Order, p. 7). The parties already
presented the Court in summary judgment pleadings with analysis and arguments regarding
application of Devault v. Steven L. Herndon, A Professional Ass’n, 107 Idaho 1, 684 P.2d 978
(1984) and Caballero v. Wilkse, 140 Idaho 329, 92 P.3d 1076 (2004), which are again cited by
Primera in its Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.

Ward

respectfully incorporates by reference the previous arguments from his prior briefing to the Court.
The Thornton decision cited at page 3 of Primera’s Memorandum has no relation to this
case. The Court is not being asked to determine the scope of the agency relationship between a
driver and passenger of an automobile or statements made following a traffic accident. The law
regarding the scope of the implied authority of an attorney clearly does not stretch so far as to cover
the improper act of disclosing confidential information in a written agreement the attorney is fully
aware of and actually helped negotiate and draft. Here, the Court correctly held that such actions
are improper and cannot fall within the scope of implied authority as a matter of law.
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above and in the prior pleadings and papers filed in support of
Ward’s motion for summary judgment, the Court should deny Primera’s motion for reconsideration.
Primera has not shown any error of law in the Court’s analysis and reasoning with respect to the
Order.
DATED this 5th day of September, 2018.
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.

By:
David T. Krueck, Of the Firm
Attorneys for Defendant
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 5th day of September, 2018, I served a true and correct
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Kimberly L. Williams
Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP
153 East Main Street
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, ID 83338
Email: klwilliams@wmlattys.com

X

U.S. Mail
Facsimile – (208) 324-3135
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Email
iCourt E-Service

David T. Krueck
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
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PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV-2017-290

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR
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vs
ALLAN WARD, an individual,
Defendant.

COMES NOW Plaintiff, PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited liability company,
by and through its attorney of record, Kimberly L. Williams, of the law firm Williams,
Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP, and hereby replies to Defendant’s Memorandum in Opposition
to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration.
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I. Argument

Agency is limited to those actions which fall under the umbrella of the purpose
for which an individual is hired. An attorney properly represents their client before the
bench, a driver properly operates a vehicle provided by his employer when on the
employer’s errand, and a real estate agent properly lists a home for sale for his real estate
client.
Actions that are proper and usual under the course of the agency are done within
the umbrella of the agency. If a real estate agent were to represent his client in court that
would be outside of the proper scope of the agency of the real estate agent. If the real
estate agent were to list a piece of property and provide incorrect data to the buyer, it
would be improper (or wrongful), but still within the scope of the agency. King v. H.J.
McNeel, Inc. 94 Idaho 444, 446, 489 P.2d 1324, 1326 (1971) (“Representations as to
boundary or quantity of land have generally been held to be binding upon the principal
even though no express authority existed giving the agent authority to make such
representation.”).
If a driver were to list his employer’s home for sale, it would be outside of the
proper scope of the driver’s agency. If a driver fails to stop at a stop sign, that is a
wrongful and improper action, but it is still within the scope of the agency.
The whole purpose of the law of agency is to hold the principal accountable for
wrongful conduct of the agent. Idaho Civil Jury Instructions 6.40.1. There would be no
purpose for the body of law regarding agency if every wrongful action of every agent
exempted the act from the scope of the agency itself.
Communicating with a prosecuting attorney is clearly within the proper scope of
representing a criminal defendant. However poorly performed the communication is
does not remove it from being within the scope of the agency. Mr. Roark while
communicating with the prosecuting attorney was acting exactly as expected to perform
his representation of Mr. Ward. Mr. Ward as the principal is responsible for the wrongful
actions of Mr. Roark taken during the course and scope of that representation.
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II. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff requests the court reconsider its Memorandum
Decision Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Plaintiff requests the court
Deny the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
DATED this 10th day of September, 2018.
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP

______________________________________
KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September 10th, 2018, I caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the manner indicated
below:
David T. Krueck
GREENER BURKE SHOEMAKER
OBERRECHT P.A.
950 W. Bannock Street, Suite 950
Boise, ID 83702
dkrueck@greenerlaw.com







U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivery
Facsimile to:
Email to:
Efile/Eservice

_______________________________
KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
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Filed: 09/13/2018 16:48:28
Fifth Judicial District, Cassia County
Joseph W Larsen, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Forthun, Theresa

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FU;TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
Liability company,

Case No. CV-2017-290

Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

vs.
ALLAN WARD, an individual
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 20, 2018, the Court issued an opinion granting Defendant Allan Ward's
("Ward") motion for summary judgment. Mem. Decision Granting Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J.
("Court's Opinion") at 1-8. On August 21, 2018, Plaintiff Primera Beef, LLC ("Primera") filed a
motion for reconsideration along with a memorandum in support of the motion. On September
5, 2018, Ward filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion and on September 10, 2018,
Primera filed a reply memorandum. On September 12, 2018, the Court heard argument from
both parties and took the matter under advisement and deemed the issue fully submitted. For the
following reasons, Primera's motion is DENIED.
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UNDISPUTED FACTS
Based on the pleadings, the Court adopts the undisputed facts recited in the Court's
Opinion on summary judgment for the purposes of the instant motion. Id. at 2-3.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion for Reconsideration

A motion for reconsideration is governed by I.R.C.P. l 1.2(b), which states: "A motion to
reconsider any order of the trial court entered before final judgment may be made at any time
prior to or within 14 days after the entry of a final judgment." A decision to grant or deny a
motion for reconsideration generally rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Spur Prod.
Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 142 Idaho 41, 49, 122 P.3d 300,308 (2005).

The Idaho Supreme Court has held on a motion for reconsideration that the trial court:
Must consider any new admissible evidence or authority bearing on the
correctness of an interlocutory order. However, a motion for reconsideration need
not be supported by any new evidence or authority. When deciding the motion for
reconsideration, the district court must apply the same standard of review that the
court applied when deciding the original order that is being
reconsidered ... [W]hen reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion
for reconsideration, this Court utilizes the same standard of review used by the
lower court in deciding the motion for reconsideration. If the decision was within
the trial court's discretion, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. On the other
hand, when reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for reconsideration
following the grant of summary judgment, this Court must determine whether the
evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment.
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012) (citations omitted).
B. Summary Judgment.

A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense, or the part
of each claim or defense on which summary judgment is sought. The court must grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56.
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The nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of
material fact exists to establish a genuine issue." Northwest. Bee-Corp v. Home Living Serv., 136
Idaho 835, 838, 41 P.3d 263, 266 (2002). Accordingly, "[t]he moving party is entitled to
judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial." Lincoln Land Co., LLC v. LP Broadband, Inc., 163 Idaho 105, 408 P.3d 465, 468-69
(2017).
When the party moving for summary judgment will not carry the burden of production or
proof at trial, the "genuine issue of material fact" burden may be met by establishing the absence
of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. Once such
an absence of evidence has been established, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the
motion to establish, via further depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, that there is indeed
a genuine issue for trial, or to offer a valid justification for the failure to do so under I.R.C.P.
56(t). Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.1994).
When considering whether the evidence in the record shows that there is no
genuine issue of material fact, the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and
draw all reasonable inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party." Therefore, "[i]f
there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over
which this Court exercises free review"
Budget Truck Sales, LLC v. Tilley, 163 Idaho 841, 419 P.3d 1139, 1144 (2018) (citations

omitted).
C. Authority

The

three

types

of

agencies

are

express authority,

implied authority,

and

apparent authority. A principal creates agency when he:
(1) [E]xpressly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions on his or her
behalf; (2) impliedly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions which
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are necessary to complete those actions that were expressly authorized; or (3)
apparently grants the agent authority to act through conduct towards a third party
indicating that express or implied authority has been granted.
Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Family Prop. Owners' Ass 'n, Inc., 162 Idaho 317, 330, 396 P.3d
1199, 1212 (2017) (quotingHumphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728, 735, 366 P.3d 1088, 1095
(2016)); Fischer v. Croston, 163 Idaho 331, 413 P.3d 731, 737-38 (2018)).
DISCUSSION
Primera does not present new facts or declarations for the Court to consider for the
instant motion, but cites additional case law not previously cited on summary judgment as well
as standard civil jury instructions.
There are three types of authority m an agency relationship: express, apparent, and
implied. See Forbush, 162 Idaho at 330, 396 P.3d at 1212. Primera, as nonmoving party on
summary judgment, bears the burden of demonstrating disputed issues of material fact under any
of the three types of authority to maintain an action of breach of a confidentiality term of a
settlement agreement against Ward for the actions of his attorney R. Keith Roark ("Roark").
Primera appears to argue strictly on an express authority theory, while Ward rebuts both the
express and implied theories. For the instant motion, neither Ward nor Primera made argument
on an apparent authority theory, thus the Court will only analyze express and implied authority.
Express authority refers to that authority which the principal has explicitly granted the
agent to act in the principal's name. Muniz v. Schrader, 115 Idaho 497,500, 767 P.2d 1272, 1275
(Ct.App.1989). Ward states he neither authorized nor even knew that Roark had intended to
disclose the terms of his settlement with Primera to the Cassia County deputy prosecutor. Ward
Deel. at ,r,r 8-9. That statement has not been contradicted or rebutted by anything in the record.
Primera appears to contend that it does not have to rebut Ward's declaration. In contrast,
Primera cites a case wherein an attorney failed to comply with court orders resulting in dismissal
MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
CV-2017-290

Page 123

Page4

of the action. Devault v. Steven L. Herndon, A Pro.fl Ass'n, 107 Idaho 1, 2-3, 684 P.2d 978, 97980 (1984). That case is not analogous to the matter before the Court, as it is a case concerning a
rule violation where the penalties for noncompliance were contained in the rule, not a commonlaw agency case from which the theories actual or express authority arise. Primera also cites a
case where a realtor misrepresented the property boundary line. King v. H. J McNeel, Inc., 94
Idaho 444, 446, 489 P.2d 1324, 1326 (1971). By longstanding precedent a real estate agent's
representations of quality or productivity of land are not binding on a principal-seller, but
representations of boundary and quantity of land are "even though no express authority existed
giving the agent authority to make such representation." Id. McNeel does not appear to have
ever been cited outside of a real estate context. Furthermore, it is not analogous to the case
before the Court because the agent in that case was a dual agent in the transaction, employed
equally by both buyer and seller.
"Express actual authority derives from an act specifically mentioned to be done in a
written or oral communication." NLRB v. Dist. Council of Iron Workers of the State of Cal. &
Vicinity, 124 F .3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1997). In the absence of evidence regarding express

authority which Primera has the burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine dispute of material
fact that Roark lacked express authority from Ward to disclose the terms of the Settlement
Agreement to a third party. The weight of precedent does not permit the Court to allow to
proceed a claim on an express authority theory where the principal makes an uncontroverted
contention he made no specific, written or oral authorization of Roark violating the
confidentiality term of the Settlement Agreement. Ward Deel. at ,r,r 8-9.
"Implied actual authority comes from a general statement of what the agent is supposed
to do; an agent is said to have the implied authority to do acts consistent with that direction." Id.
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It is that authority "which is necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or perform" the
express authority delegated to the agent by the principal. Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10, 12, 501
P .2d 278, 280 (1972).
Under this theory Ward could only be liable for the actions of Roark that were
"necessary, usual, and proper" to accomplish the task expressly authorized by Ward, which was
to represent him in the criminal matter. "Proper authority" implied to carry out an express
authority cannot be read as authority to do something improper in carrying out the express
authority-such as disclosing the confidential terms of an agreement-and therefore forecloses
liability imputed to Ward on the basis of an implied authority theory.
ORDER

Based on the foregoing, there is no genuine dispute no genuine dispute as to any material
fact under either a theory of express authority or implied authority and summary judgment is
proper. and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, Primera's motion
for reconsideration is DENIED.

It is so ORDERED this

_jJ_ day of September, 2018.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September _
13_, 2018 I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, to each of the following:

1. David T. Krueck
ELAM & B URKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1359
Boise, ID 83701

_x

2. Kimberly L. Williams

Email:

dtk@elamburke.com

Email:

kl will iams@ wmlattys .com

WILLIAMS, M ESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP

153 E Main Street
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, ID 83338

Joseph W. Larsen
Clerk of the District Court
Cassia County, Idaho

By:

\. ~
- - - -----------Deputy Clerk
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Filed: 10/24/2018 09:03:34
Fifth Judicial District, Cassia County
Joseph W Larsen, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Gunderson, Tara

DAVID T. KRUECK, ISB No. 6246
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
Email: dtk@elamburke.com
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
Case No. CV-2017-290

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT
vs.
ALLAN WARD, an individual,
Defendant.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on Plaintiff’s Complaint, and the
July 20, 2018 Memorandum Decision Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
September 13, 2018 Memorandum Decision Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration
having been entered, and the Court having been fully advised in the premises and good cause
appearing therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant Allan Ward
have and recover against Plaintiff Primera Beef, LLC judgment in the amount $11,249.00, plus
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interest on said judgment amount at the legal rate of seven and three eighths percent (7.375%)
per annum until said judgment is paid in full.
Signed: 10/23/2018 07:12 PM

DATED this _____
24 day of October, 2018.

Hon. Michael P. Tribe
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _____
24 day of October, 2018, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals by the method
indicated below, addressed as follows:
Kimberly L. Williams
Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP
153 East Main Street
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, ID 83338
Email: klwilliams@wmlattys.com

x

David T. Krueck
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
Email: dtk@elamburke.com

x

Clerk

4849-2905-2278, v. 1
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U.S. Mail
Facsimile – (208) 324-3135
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Email
iCourt E-Service
U.S. Mail
Facsimile – (208) 384-5844
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Email
iCourt E-Service

Electronically Filed
12/4/2018 4:56 PM
Fifth Judicial District, Cassia County
Joseph W. Larsen, Clerk of the Court
By: Noemi Alanis, Deputy Clerk

KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
IDAHO STATE BAR NO. 8893
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LARSEN, LLP
Attorneys at Law
153 East Main Street
P. O. Box 168
Jerome, Idaho 83338
Telephone: (208) 324-2303
Facsimile: (208) 324-3135
klwilliams@wmlattys.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CASSIA COUNTY

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,

Case No. CV-2017-290

Plaintiff/Appellant,

NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs
ALLAN WARD, an individual,
Category: L.4
Filing Fee: $129.00

Defendant/Respondent.

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, ALLAN WARD (“Ward”), AND THE
PARTY'S ATTORNEYS David T. Krueck, of ELAM & BURKE, P.A., 251 E. Front
Street, Suite 300, Boise, Idaho 83701, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED
COURT .

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1. The above named Appellant, PRIMERA BEEF, LLC (“Primera”), appeals against
the above named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Judgment

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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entered in the above entitled action (“Proceeding”) on the 24th day of October,
2018, on the Memorandum Decision Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment entered in the above entitled action on the 20th day of July, 2018, and
the Memorandum Decision Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration
entered in the above entitled action on September 13th, 2018, Honorable Judge
Michael P. Tribe presiding in each. Copies of the judgment and orders being
appealed are attached to this notice, as well as a copy of the final judgment if this
is an appeal from an order entered after final judgment.

2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments
or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant
to Rule 11(a)(1). I.A.R.
 This is an EXPEDITED APPEAL pursuant to I.A.R. 12.2.

3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then intends
to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent
the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal, are as follows:

(a) Did the Court commit error in finding that the Ward’s attorney was not
acting within the course and scope his agency on behalf of Ward when the
attorney violated the terms of the underlying Agreement?
(b) Did the Court commit error in granting summary judgment to Ward upon
the finding that Ward’s attorney was not acting within the course and
scope of his agency on behalf of Ward when violating the terms of the
underlying Agreement?
(c) Did the Court commit error in denying Primera’s motion to reconsider the
court’s finding that Ward’s attorney was not acting within the course and
scope of his agency on behalf of Ward when violating the terms of the
underlying Agreement?
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(d) The Appellant reserves the right to present other issues on appeal after
review of the clerk's record and reporter's transcripts to be prepared in this
appeal.

4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? Yes.
If so, what portion?

Exhibit A to Declaration of Allan Ward in Support of Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment dated May 2nd, 2018.

5. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes.
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions
of the reporter's transcript in  hard copy  electronic format  both
(check one):
i. Hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, held September 10th,
2018 at 2:00 p.m.;
ii. Hearing on the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and the
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, held June 1st, 2018, at 3:00
p.m.
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's
(agency's) record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28,
I.A.R.
i.

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment;

ii.

Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment;

iii.

Declaration of Allan Ward in Support of Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, and exhibits attached thereto;

iv.

Declaration of David T. Krueck in Support of Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, and exhibits attached thereto;

v.

Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment;
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vi.

Affidavit of Gary D. Slette in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, and exhibits attached thereto;

vii. Declaration of Dustin Dean in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment;
viii. Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment;
ix.

Memorandum Decision Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment;

x.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration;

xi.

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration;

xii. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration;
xiii. Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration;
xiv. Memorandum Decision Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration;
Civil Cases Only. The appellate requests the following documents, charts, or
pictures offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme
Court: N/A
7. I certify:
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom
a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Name and address: Patricia Hubbell
Court Reporter
Cassia County Courthouse
1459 Overland Ave
Burley, ID 83318
phubbell@cassiacounty.org
(b)

(1)  That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has

been paid the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript.
(2)  That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript
fee because
_______________________________________________________________
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(c)

(1)  That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's

record has been paid.
(2)  That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the
preparation of the record because
_________________________________________________________________

(d)

(1)  That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
(2)  That appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing

fee because
________________________________________________________________

(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20.

DATED THIS 4th day of December, 2018
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LARSEN, LLP

_________________________________
KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
Attorneys for the Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on December 4th, 2018, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the manner
indicated below:
David T. Krueck
ELAM & BURKE, PA
251 E Front St, Ste 300
PO Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701-1539
dtk@elamburke.com







Patricia Hubbell
Court Reporter
Cassia County Courthouse
1459 Overland Ave
Burley, ID 83318
phubbell@cassiacounty.org

 U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
 Hand Delivery
 Facsimile to:
 Email to:
phubbell@cassiacounty.org
 Efile/Eservice

Clerk of the Court
Cassia County Courthouse
Attn: Tara Gunderson
1459 Overland Ave
Burley, ID 83318
tgunderson@cassiacounty.org

 U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
 Hand Delivery
 Facsimile to:
 Email to:
tgunderson@cassiacounty.org
 Efile/Eservice

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivery
Facsimile to:
Email to:
Efile/Eservice

______________________________
KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
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Filed: 10/24/2018 09:03:34
Fifth Judicial District, Cassia County
Joseph W Larsen, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk - Gunderson, Tara

DAVID T. KRUECK, ISB No. 6246
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
Telephone: (208) 343-5454
Facsimile: (208) 384-5844
Email: dtk@elamburke.com
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
Case No. CV-2017-290

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT
vs.
ALLAN WARD, an individual,
Defendant.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
THIS MATTER having come before the Court on Plaintiff’s Complaint, and the
July 20, 2018 Memorandum Decision Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
September 13, 2018 Memorandum Decision Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration
having been entered, and the Court having been fully advised in the premises and good cause
appearing therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendant Allan Ward
have and recover against Plaintiff Primera Beef, LLC judgment in the amount $11,249.00, plus
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interest on said judgment amount at the legal rate of seven and three eighths percent (7.375%)
per annum until said judgment is paid in full.
Signed: 10/23/2018 07:12 PM

DATED this _____
24 day of October, 2018.

Hon. Michael P. Tribe
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the _____
24 day of October, 2018, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing by delivering the same to each of the following individuals by the method
indicated below, addressed as follows:
Kimberly L. Williams
Williams, Meservy & Lothspeich, LLP
153 East Main Street
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, ID 83338
Email: klwilliams@wmlattys.com

x

David T. Krueck
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701
Email: dtk@elamburke.com

x

Clerk
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U.S. Mail
Facsimile – (208) 324-3135
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Email
iCourt E-Service
U.S. Mail
Facsimile – (208) 384-5844
Overnight Mail
Hand Delivery
Email
iCourt E-Service
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
Liability company,

Case No. CV-2017-290

Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FORSU MMAR YJUDG MENT

vs.
ALLAN WARD, an individual
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Primera Beef, LLC ("Primera") filed their Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on
March 13, 201 7, alleging a single cause of action against Allan Ward ("Ward") for breach
of a
confidentiality term of a settlement agreement ("Agreement"). Ward filed an answer
and a
counterclaim on April 24, 2017 and a motion for summary judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P.
56 on
May 3, 2018. On stipulation of both parties, the Court dismissed Ward's counterclaim
with
prejudice on May 21, 2018. The Court heard oral argument on Ward's summary judgme
nt
motion on June 1, 2018. The matter was taken under advisement and deemed fully submitte
d on
that date. For the following reasons, Ward's motion is GRANTED.
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UNDISPUTED FACTS
Based on the pleadings, the following facts are undisputed for the purposes of Ward's
motion:
In November 2016, the parties and their attorneys executed the Agreement in conjunction
with prior litigation in Cassia County Case no. CV-2016-859 ("the underlying lawsuit"). Deel. of
Allan Ward in Sup. of Def's. Mot. for Sum. Jud. ("Ward Deel."), Ex. A. For Primera, the
Agreement was executed by Dustin Dean and by its attorney Gary D. Slette. Id. For Ward and
Little Moo Cattle Company, the Agreement was executed by Ward and his attorney R. Keith
Roark ("Mr. Roark"). Id. The Agreement included a confidentiality clause, combined with a
non-disparagement clause. Id. The Agreement states, "[ e]xcept as otherwise required by this
Agreement, law, or order of a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties shall keep the terms of
this Agreement strictly confidential." Id. at ,i 6. In addition, a liquidated damage provision was
included for a breach of the Agreement. Compl. & Demand for Jury Trial ("Compl.") at ,i 7. The
Agreement was entered into on or about November 10, 2016. Ward Deel. at ,i 5. The underlying
lawsuit was dismissed on November 16, 2016. Id. at ,i 7.
Ward continued to engage Mr. Roark as his attorney to defend him in a related criminal
matter then pending in Cassia County after the execution of the Agreement.

Following the

dismissal of the underlying lawsuit, Ward inquired "with my counsel, R. Keith Roark, whether it
would be possible to also have the criminal matter dismissed." Ward Deel. at

,r 8.

Mr. Roark

drafted and sent a letter dated January 9, 2017, to a deputy Cassia County Prosecutor in an effort
to resolve the criminal matter. Aff. of Gary D. Slette in Opp. to Def's. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B.
In the January 9 th letter, Mr. Roark notified the deputy prosecutor of the settlement in the
underlying lawsuit. Primera's claim for breach of the Agreement is based upon the January 9 th

MEMORAND UM DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANT 'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
CV-2017-290

Page 140

Page 2

letter. Compl. at ,r 11. Ward maintains that he did not direct, authorize or review the letter prior
to Mr. Roark sending the letter.

LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment.

A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense, or the part
of each claim or defense on which summary judgment is sought. The court must grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56.
The nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of
material fact exists to establish a genuine issue." Northwest. Bee-Corp v. Home Living Serv., 136
Idaho 835, 838, 41 P.3d 263, 266 (2002). Accordingly, "[t]he moving party is entitled to
judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial." Lincoln Land Co., LLC v. LP Broadband, Inc., 163 Idaho 105, 408 P.3d 465, 468-69
(2017).
When the party moving for summary judgment will not carry the burden of production or
proof at trial, the "genuine issue of material fact" burden may be met by establishing the absence
of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. Once such
an absence of evidence has been established, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the
motion to establish, via further depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, that there is indeed
a genuine issue for trial, or to offer a valid justification for the failure to do so under I.R.C.P.
56(f). Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist., 125 Idaho 872,874,876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.1994).
When considering whether the evidence in the record shows that there is no
genuine issue of material fact, the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and
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draw all reasonable inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party." Therefore, "[i]f
there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over
which this Court exercises free review" (citations omitted). Budget Truck Sales, LLC v. Tilley, 163 Idaho 841, 419 P .3d 1139, 1144 (2018).
B. Authority

The

three

types

of

agencies

are

express authority,

implied authority,

and

apparent authority. A principal creates agency when he:
(1) [E]xpressly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions on his or her
behalf; (2) impliedly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions which
are necessary to complete those actions that were expressly authorized; or (3)
apparently grants the agent authority to act through conduct towards a third party
indicating that express or implied authority has been granted.

Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Family Prop. Owners' Ass'n, Inc., 162 Idaho 317, 330, 396 P.3d

1199, 1212 (2017) (quotingHumphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728, 735, 366 P.3d 1088, 1095
(2016)); Fischer v. Croston, 163 Idaho 331,413 P.3d 731, 737-38 (2018).
C. Breach of Contract

"The elements for a claim for breach of contract are: (a) the existence of the contract, (b)
the breach of the contract, (c) the breach caused damages, and (d) the amount of those damages."
Mosel! Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., 154 Idaho 269,278,297 P.3d 232,241 (2013); Path to
Health, LLP v. Long, 161 Idaho 50, 57,383 P.3d 1220, 1227 (2016).
DISCUSSION

The single question this Court is required to answer is: Did Mr. Roark have authority to
disclose the terms· of the Agreement in an attempt to settle the criminal matter? The parties do
not disagree that Mr. Roark was representing Ward as his attorney in the criminal proceeding at
the time the Agreement was disclosed to the deputy prosecutor. Pl' s Mem. in Opp. to Def' s Mot.
for Summ. J. ("Pl's Mem.") at 3; Defs Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Sumrn. J. at 4. ("Defs.
Mem."). The parties do not contend that Ward personally breached the terms of the Agreement.
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Def s. Reply Mern. in Supp. of Def s. Mot. for Surnm. J. at I. Liability can only attach to Ward
through a finding that his agent, Mr. Roark, had at least one of the three types of authority to act
recognized in Idaho law.
A. Express Authority

Express authority refers to that authority which the principal has explicitly granted the
agent to act in the principal's name. Muniz v. Schrader, 115 Idaho 497, 500, 767 P.2d 1272, 1275
(Ct.App.1989). Ward unequivocally states he neither authorized nor even knew that Mr. Roark
had intended to disclose the terms of his settlement with Primera to the Cassia County deputy
prosecutor. Ward Deel. at

,r,r

8-9. That statement has not been contradicted or rebutted by

anything in the record. In the absence of evidence regarding express authority which Primera
has the burden of proof at trial, there is, therefore, no genuine dispute of material fact as to Mr.
Roark lacking express authority from Ward to disclose the terms of the Agreement to a third
party.
B. Apparent Authority

Apparent authority differs from express and implied authority in that it is not based on
the words and conduct of the principal toward the agent, but on the principal' s words and
conduct toward the third party. Apparent authority may be found when a principal voluntarily
places an agent in such a position that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with the
business usages and the nature of a particular business, is justified in believing that the agent is
acting pursuant to existing authority. Tri-Circle, Inc. v. Brugger Corp~, 121 Idaho 950, 955, 829
P .2d 540, 545 (Ct. App. 1992). "Consequently, apparent authority cannot arise from the acts and
statements of the agent alone; it must be based upon the principal's words and conduct." Landvik
by Landvik v. Herbert, 130 Idaho 54, 59, 936 P.2d 697, 702 (Ct.App.1997).
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Based upon the pleadings, motions, affidavits, declarations and exhibits on file in this
case there is an absence of evidence that Ward made any statement or that his conduct would
communicate to any party that Mr. Roark was authorized to disclose the prohibited Agreement
terms on his behalf. The mere fact that Mr. Roark was retained as Ward's attorney in both
matters does not, on its own, rise to the level of apparent authority to attribute the breach of the
confidential provisions of the Agreement to Ward. Ward could expect Mr. Roark to attempt to
settle the criminal matter and in fact he asked Mr. Roark if the criminal could be resolved. Ward
Deel. at

,r 8.

However, there is nothing in the record indicating that Ward authorized disclosure

of the barred provisions of the Agreement. In fact, Ward specifically states he did not "ask or
authorize [Mr. Roark] to disclose any of the terms of the settlement to the Prosecuting Attorney
for Cassia County" Id. Primera has not contradicted that sworn declaration by way of affidavit
or declaration. The doctrine of apparent authority is inapplicable to the facts as presented and
provides no basis for permitting Primera's claims of agency liability.
C. Implied Authority

Implied authority refers to that authority "which is necessary, usual, and proper to
accomplish or perform" the express authority delegated to the agent by the principal. Clark v.
Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10, 12,501 P.2d 278,280 (1972).
It is not disputed that Ward retained Mr. Roark to defend him in the criminal action.

Ward Deel. at

,r 8.

It is also not disputed that Ward did not give him the express authority to

divulge the confidentiality provisions of the Agreement. Id. Simply because Mr. Roark had been
retained and had express authority to represent Ward in the criminal proceedings cannot lead to
the legal conclusion that any action taken by Mr. Roark to settle that matter fell within the scope
of that express representation or that there was implied authority to take action that could lead to
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liability for Ward under the Agreement. Instead, Primera must prove that the disclosure of the
confidential terms of the Agreement was "necessary, usual, and proper" in the performance of
Mr. Roark's duties as Ward's criminal attorney, in order for an action to be maintained under the
theory of implied authority. The Court cannot make such a finding as there is an absence of
evidence that such action was necessary, usual, and proper.
Primera asserts that whether Mr. Roark was acting within his express or implied authority
is a question of fact. Pl's Mem. at 4. However, Primera fails to identify what evidence gives rise
to a question of fact on this issue. Ward states in his declaration that he did not authorize Mr.
Roark nor did he have any advanced knowledge that Mr. Roark intended to send a letter to the
deputy prosecutor disclosing the terms of the Agreement. Ward. Deel. at

,r,r 8 and

11. Primera

has not presented any facts to refute this declaration or to create a genuine issue of material fact
to explain or define the implied scope of Mr. Roark's authority as Ward's attorney in the
criminal proceeding.
As argued by Ward, "[i]f as Primera complains, the disclosure of the terms of the
Settlement Agreement was improper (i.e. a breach of the Agreement), then Mr. Roark's conduct
in allegedly doing so could not be 'necessary, usual, and proper."' Def s. Mem. at 7. The Court
cannot find that it was "necessary, usual, and proper" for Mr. Roark to disclose confidential
terms of a civil settlement agreement to diligently and fully represent the same client in a
separate criminal case after having been aware of and participated in the settlement negotiations,
which resolved the civil matter.
ORDER

Based on the foregoing, there is no genuine dispute that Ward personally breached the
terms of the Agreement. In addition, there is an absence of evidence and therefore no disputed
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fact that Ward never expressly authorized Mr. Roark to disclose the Agreement to a third party
nor are there any "words or conduct" by Ward that give rise to apparent authority for Mr.
Roark's actions.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that the disclosure of the confidential

portions of the Agreement were "necessary, usual, and proper" for the resolution of the criminal
case and that Mr. Roark had implied authority to divulge the confidential portions of the
Agreement. Finally, Primera has not produced additional material to establish a disputed issue of
material fact regarding the theories of agency. Therefore, Ward's motion for summary judgment
is GRANTED and it is unnecessary for the Court to rule as to liquid damages provision .

It is so ORDERED this

/(. \r-.

2U

day of July, 2018.

//;Y?/~
MICHAEL P. TRIBE
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

lo,

I hereby certify that on July
2018 I caused to be served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, to each of the following:

1. David T. Krueck
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1359
Boise, ID 83701

X

Email:

dtk@elamburke.com

2. Kimberly L. Williams

X

Email:

klwilliams@wmlattys.com

WILLIAMS, MES ER VY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP

153 E Main Street
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, ID 83338

Joseph W. Larsen
Clerk of the District Court
~ s s i a County, Idaho
By:

l,{_,~
Deputy Clerk
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Filed: 09/13/2018 16:48:28
Fifth Judicial District, Cassia County
Joseph W Larsen, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Forthun, Theresa

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FU;TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
Liability company,

Case No. CV-2017-290

Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

vs.
ALLAN WARD, an individual
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 20, 2018, the Court issued an opinion granting Defendant Allan Ward's
("Ward") motion for summary judgment. Mem. Decision Granting Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J.
("Court's Opinion") at 1-8. On August 21, 2018, Plaintiff Primera Beef, LLC ("Primera") filed a
motion for reconsideration along with a memorandum in support of the motion. On September
5, 2018, Ward filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion and on September 10, 2018,
Primera filed a reply memorandum. On September 12, 2018, the Court heard argument from
both parties and took the matter under advisement and deemed the issue fully submitted. For the
following reasons, Primera's motion is DENIED.
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UNDISPUTED FACTS
Based on the pleadings, the Court adopts the undisputed facts recited in the Court's
Opinion on summary judgment for the purposes of the instant motion. Id. at 2-3.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion for Reconsideration

A motion for reconsideration is governed by I.R.C.P. l 1.2(b), which states: "A motion to
reconsider any order of the trial court entered before final judgment may be made at any time
prior to or within 14 days after the entry of a final judgment." A decision to grant or deny a
motion for reconsideration generally rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Spur Prod.
Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 142 Idaho 41, 49, 122 P.3d 300,308 (2005).

The Idaho Supreme Court has held on a motion for reconsideration that the trial court:
Must consider any new admissible evidence or authority bearing on the
correctness of an interlocutory order. However, a motion for reconsideration need
not be supported by any new evidence or authority. When deciding the motion for
reconsideration, the district court must apply the same standard of review that the
court applied when deciding the original order that is being
reconsidered ... [W]hen reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion
for reconsideration, this Court utilizes the same standard of review used by the
lower court in deciding the motion for reconsideration. If the decision was within
the trial court's discretion, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. On the other
hand, when reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for reconsideration
following the grant of summary judgment, this Court must determine whether the
evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment.
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012) (citations omitted).
B. Summary Judgment.

A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense, or the part
of each claim or defense on which summary judgment is sought. The court must grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56.
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The nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of
material fact exists to establish a genuine issue." Northwest. Bee-Corp v. Home Living Serv., 136
Idaho 835, 838, 41 P.3d 263, 266 (2002). Accordingly, "[t]he moving party is entitled to
judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial." Lincoln Land Co., LLC v. LP Broadband, Inc., 163 Idaho 105, 408 P.3d 465, 468-69
(2017).
When the party moving for summary judgment will not carry the burden of production or
proof at trial, the "genuine issue of material fact" burden may be met by establishing the absence
of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. Once such
an absence of evidence has been established, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the
motion to establish, via further depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, that there is indeed
a genuine issue for trial, or to offer a valid justification for the failure to do so under I.R.C.P.
56(t). Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.1994).
When considering whether the evidence in the record shows that there is no
genuine issue of material fact, the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and
draw all reasonable inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party." Therefore, "[i]f
there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over
which this Court exercises free review"
Budget Truck Sales, LLC v. Tilley, 163 Idaho 841, 419 P.3d 1139, 1144 (2018) (citations

omitted).
C. Authority

The

three

types

of

agencies

are

express authority,

implied authority,

and

apparent authority. A principal creates agency when he:
(1) [E]xpressly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions on his or her
behalf; (2) impliedly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions which
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are necessary to complete those actions that were expressly authorized; or (3)
apparently grants the agent authority to act through conduct towards a third party
indicating that express or implied authority has been granted.
Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Family Prop. Owners' Ass 'n, Inc., 162 Idaho 317, 330, 396 P.3d
1199, 1212 (2017) (quotingHumphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728, 735, 366 P.3d 1088, 1095
(2016)); Fischer v. Croston, 163 Idaho 331, 413 P.3d 731, 737-38 (2018)).
DISCUSSION
Primera does not present new facts or declarations for the Court to consider for the
instant motion, but cites additional case law not previously cited on summary judgment as well
as standard civil jury instructions.
There are three types of authority m an agency relationship: express, apparent, and
implied. See Forbush, 162 Idaho at 330, 396 P.3d at 1212. Primera, as nonmoving party on
summary judgment, bears the burden of demonstrating disputed issues of material fact under any
of the three types of authority to maintain an action of breach of a confidentiality term of a
settlement agreement against Ward for the actions of his attorney R. Keith Roark ("Roark").
Primera appears to argue strictly on an express authority theory, while Ward rebuts both the
express and implied theories. For the instant motion, neither Ward nor Primera made argument
on an apparent authority theory, thus the Court will only analyze express and implied authority.
Express authority refers to that authority which the principal has explicitly granted the
agent to act in the principal's name. Muniz v. Schrader, 115 Idaho 497,500, 767 P.2d 1272, 1275
(Ct.App.1989). Ward states he neither authorized nor even knew that Roark had intended to
disclose the terms of his settlement with Primera to the Cassia County deputy prosecutor. Ward
Deel. at ,r,r 8-9. That statement has not been contradicted or rebutted by anything in the record.
Primera appears to contend that it does not have to rebut Ward's declaration. In contrast,
Primera cites a case wherein an attorney failed to comply with court orders resulting in dismissal
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of the action. Devault v. Steven L. Herndon, A Pro.fl Ass'n, 107 Idaho 1, 2-3, 684 P.2d 978, 97980 (1984). That case is not analogous to the matter before the Court, as it is a case concerning a
rule violation where the penalties for noncompliance were contained in the rule, not a commonlaw agency case from which the theories actual or express authority arise. Primera also cites a
case where a realtor misrepresented the property boundary line. King v. H. J McNeel, Inc., 94
Idaho 444, 446, 489 P.2d 1324, 1326 (1971). By longstanding precedent a real estate agent's
representations of quality or productivity of land are not binding on a principal-seller, but
representations of boundary and quantity of land are "even though no express authority existed
giving the agent authority to make such representation." Id. McNeel does not appear to have
ever been cited outside of a real estate context. Furthermore, it is not analogous to the case
before the Court because the agent in that case was a dual agent in the transaction, employed
equally by both buyer and seller.
"Express actual authority derives from an act specifically mentioned to be done in a
written or oral communication." NLRB v. Dist. Council of Iron Workers of the State of Cal. &
Vicinity, 124 F .3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1997). In the absence of evidence regarding express

authority which Primera has the burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine dispute of material
fact that Roark lacked express authority from Ward to disclose the terms of the Settlement
Agreement to a third party. The weight of precedent does not permit the Court to allow to
proceed a claim on an express authority theory where the principal makes an uncontroverted
contention he made no specific, written or oral authorization of Roark violating the
confidentiality term of the Settlement Agreement. Ward Deel. at ,r,r 8-9.
"Implied actual authority comes from a general statement of what the agent is supposed
to do; an agent is said to have the implied authority to do acts consistent with that direction." Id.
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It is that authority "which is necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or perform" the
express authority delegated to the agent by the principal. Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10, 12, 501
P .2d 278, 280 (1972).
Under this theory Ward could only be liable for the actions of Roark that were
"necessary, usual, and proper" to accomplish the task expressly authorized by Ward, which was
to represent him in the criminal matter. "Proper authority" implied to carry out an express
authority cannot be read as authority to do something improper in carrying out the express
authority-such as disclosing the confidential terms of an agreement-and therefore forecloses
liability imputed to Ward on the basis of an implied authority theory.
ORDER

Based on the foregoing, there is no genuine dispute no genuine dispute as to any material
fact under either a theory of express authority or implied authority and summary judgment is
proper. and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, Primera's motion
for reconsideration is DENIED.

It is so ORDERED this

_jJ_ day of September, 2018.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on September _
13_, 2018 I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, to each of the following:

1. David T. Krueck
ELAM & B URKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1359
Boise, ID 83701

_x

2. Kimberly L. Williams

Email:

dtk@elamburke.com

Email:

kl will iams@ wmlattys .com

WILLIAMS, M ESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP

153 E Main Street
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, ID 83338

Joseph W. Larsen
Clerk of the District Court
Cassia County, Idaho

By:
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
th
THE 5 JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO
ON: 12/27/2018 04:58 PM
JOSEPH W. LARSEN
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
Filed By: tg

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

Case No. CV-2017-290

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED JUDGMENT

vs.
ALLAN WARD, an individual,
Defendant.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
The Defendant Allan Ward is awarded judgment against Plaintiff Primera Beef, LLC
nunc pro tune October 24, 2018, in the amount of $11,249.00, plus interest on said judgment

amount at the legal rate of seven and thee-eights percent (7 .3 7 5%) per annum until said judgment
is paid in full.
DATED this

Lr day of December, 2018.

~
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on December _ _, 2018, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, to each of the following:

1. David T. Krueck
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1359
Boise, ID 83701

X

Email:

dtk@elamburke.com

2. Kimberly L. Williams

X

Email:

klwilliams@wmlattys.com

WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP

153 E. Main Street
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, ID 83338

Joseph W. Larsen
Clerk of the District Court
Cassia County, Idaho
(
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Electronically Filed
12/31/2018 11:56 AM
Fifth Judicial District, Cassia County
Joseph W. Larsen, Clerk of the Court
By: Noemi Alanis, Deputy Clerk

KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
IDAHO STATE BAR NO. 8893
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LARSEN, LLP
Attorneys at Law
153 East Main Street
P. O. Box 168
Jerome, Idaho 83338
Telephone: (208) 324-2303
Facsimile: (208) 324-3135
klwilliams@wmlattys.com

Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CASSIA COUNTY

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,

Case No. CV-2017-290

Plaintiff/Appellant,

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL

vs
ALLAN WARD, an individual,
Defendant/Respondent.

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, ALLAN WARD (“Ward”), AND THE
PARTY'S ATTORNEYS David T. Krueck, of ELAM & BURKE, P.A., 251 E. Front
Street, Suite 300, Boise, Idaho 83701, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED
COURT .

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:

1. The above named Appellant, PRIMERA BEEF, LLC (“Primera”), appeals against
the above named respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the final Amended

AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
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Judgment entered in the above entitled action (“Proceeding”) on the 27th day of
December, 2018, on the Memorandum Decision Granting Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment entered in the above entitled action on the 20th day of July,
2018, and the Memorandum Decision Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration entered in the above entitled action on September 13th, 2018,
Honorable Judge Michael P. Tribe presiding in each. Copies of the judgment and
orders being appealed are attached to this notice, as well as a copy of the final
judgment if this is an appeal from an order entered after final judgment.

2. That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments
or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant
to Rule 11(a)(1). I.A.R.
 This is an EXPEDITED APPEAL pursuant to I.A.R. 12.2.

3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the appellant then intends
to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent
the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal, are as follows:

(a) Did the Court commit error in finding that the Ward’s attorney was not
acting within the course and scope his agency on behalf of Ward when the
attorney violated the terms of the underlying Agreement?
(b) Did the Court commit error in granting summary judgment to Ward upon
the finding that Ward’s attorney was not acting within the course and
scope of his agency on behalf of Ward when violating the terms of the
underlying Agreement?
(c) Did the Court commit error in denying Primera’s motion to reconsider the
court’s finding that Ward’s attorney was not acting within the course and
scope of his agency on behalf of Ward when violating the terms of the
underlying Agreement?
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(d) The Appellant reserves the right to present other issues on appeal after
review of the clerk's record and reporter's transcripts to be prepared in this
appeal.

4. Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? Yes.
If so, what portion?

Exhibit A to Declaration of Allan Ward in Support of Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment dated May 2nd, 2018.

5. (a) Is a reporter's transcript requested? Yes.
(b) The appellant requests the preparation of the following portions
of the reporter's transcript in  hard copy  electronic format  both
(check one):
i. Hearing on Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, held September 10th,
2018 at 2:00 p.m.;
ii. Hearing on the Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and the
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, held June 1st, 2018, at 3:00
p.m.
6. The appellant requests the following documents to be included in the clerk's
(agency's) record in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28,
I.A.R.
i.

Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment;

ii.

Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment;

iii.

Declaration of Allan Ward in Support of Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, and exhibits attached thereto;

iv.

Declaration of David T. Krueck in Support of Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, and exhibits attached thereto;

v.

Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment;
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vi.

Affidavit of Gary D. Slette in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment, and exhibits attached thereto;

vii. Declaration of Dustin Dean in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment;
viii. Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment;
ix.

Memorandum Decision Granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary
Judgment;

x.

Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration;

xi.

Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration;

xii. Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration;
xiii. Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for
Reconsideration;
xiv. Memorandum Decision Denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration;
Civil Cases Only. The appellate requests the following documents, charts, or
pictures offered or admitted as exhibits to be copied and sent to the Supreme
Court: N/A
7. I certify:
(a) That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of whom
a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out below:
Name and address: Patricia Hubbell
Court Reporter
Cassia County Courthouse
1459 Overland Ave
Burley, ID 83318
phubbell@cassiacounty.org
(b)

(1)  That the clerk of the district court or administrative agency has

been paid the estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript.
(2)  That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated transcript
fee because
_______________________________________________________________
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(c)

(1)  That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's or agency's

record has been paid.
(2)  That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the
preparation of the record because
_________________________________________________________________

(d)

(1)  That the appellate filing fee has been paid.
(2)  That appellant is exempt from paying the appellate filing

fee because
________________________________________________________________

(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to
Rule 20.

DATED THIS 31st day of December, 2018
WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LARSEN, LLP

_________________________________
KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
Attorneys for the Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on December 31st, 2018, I caused a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document to be served upon the following person(s) in the manner
indicated below:
David T. Krueck
ELAM & BURKE, PA
251 E Front St, Ste 300
PO Box 1539
Boise, ID 83701-1539
dtk@elamburke.com







Patricia Hubbell
Court Reporter
Cassia County Courthouse
1459 Overland Ave
Burley, ID 83318
phubbell@cassiacounty.org

 U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
 Hand Delivery
 Facsimile to:
 Email to:
phubbell@cassiacounty.org
 Efile/Eservice

Clerk of the Court
Cassia County Courthouse
Attn: Tara Gunderson
1459 Overland Ave
Burley, ID 83318
tgunderson@cassiacounty.org

 U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
 Hand Delivery
 Facsimile to:
 Email to:
tgunderson@cassiacounty.org
 Efile/Eservice

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid
Hand Delivery
Facsimile to:
Email to:
Efile/Eservice

______________________________
KIMBERLY L. WILLIAMS
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
th
THE 5 JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASSIA COUNTY, IDAHO
ON: 12/27/2018 04:58 PM
JOSEPH W. LARSEN
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT
Filed By: tg

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

Case No. CV-2017-290

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
liability company,
Plaintiff,

AMENDED JUDGMENT

vs.
ALLAN WARD, an individual,
Defendant.

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS:
The Defendant Allan Ward is awarded judgment against Plaintiff Primera Beef, LLC
nunc pro tune October 24, 2018, in the amount of $11,249.00, plus interest on said judgment

amount at the legal rate of seven and thee-eights percent (7 .3 7 5%) per annum until said judgment
is paid in full.
DATED this

Lr day of December, 2018.

~
District Judge

AMENDED JUDGMENT
CV-2017-290
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on December _ _, 2018, I caused to be served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, to each of the following:

1. David T. Krueck
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1359
Boise, ID 83701

X

Email:

dtk@elamburke.com

2. Kimberly L. Williams

X

Email:

klwilliams@wmlattys.com

WILLIAMS, MESERVY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP

153 E. Main Street
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, ID 83338

Joseph W. Larsen
Clerk of the District Court
Cassia County, Idaho
(

B·
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
th
THE 5 JUDICIAL DISTRICT
CASSIA COUNTY , IDAHO
ON: 7/20/201 8 05:01 PM
JOSEPH W. LARSEN
CLERK OF THE DISTRICT COURT

Filed By: tg

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA
PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
Liability company,

Case No. CV-2017-290

Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION
FORSU MMAR YJUDG MENT

vs.
ALLAN WARD, an individual
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Primera Beef, LLC ("Primera") filed their Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial on
March 13, 201 7, alleging a single cause of action against Allan Ward ("Ward") for breach
of a
confidentiality term of a settlement agreement ("Agreement"). Ward filed an answer
and a
counterclaim on April 24, 2017 and a motion for summary judgment pursuant to I.R.C.P.
56 on
May 3, 2018. On stipulation of both parties, the Court dismissed Ward's counterclaim
with
prejudice on May 21, 2018. The Court heard oral argument on Ward's summary judgme
nt
motion on June 1, 2018. The matter was taken under advisement and deemed fully submitte
d on
that date. For the following reasons, Ward's motion is GRANTED.
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UNDISPUTED FACTS
Based on the pleadings, the following facts are undisputed for the purposes of Ward's
motion:
In November 2016, the parties and their attorneys executed the Agreement in conjunction
with prior litigation in Cassia County Case no. CV-2016-859 ("the underlying lawsuit"). Deel. of
Allan Ward in Sup. of Def's. Mot. for Sum. Jud. ("Ward Deel."), Ex. A. For Primera, the
Agreement was executed by Dustin Dean and by its attorney Gary D. Slette. Id. For Ward and
Little Moo Cattle Company, the Agreement was executed by Ward and his attorney R. Keith
Roark ("Mr. Roark"). Id. The Agreement included a confidentiality clause, combined with a
non-disparagement clause. Id. The Agreement states, "[ e]xcept as otherwise required by this
Agreement, law, or order of a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties shall keep the terms of
this Agreement strictly confidential." Id. at ,i 6. In addition, a liquidated damage provision was
included for a breach of the Agreement. Compl. & Demand for Jury Trial ("Compl.") at ,i 7. The
Agreement was entered into on or about November 10, 2016. Ward Deel. at ,i 5. The underlying
lawsuit was dismissed on November 16, 2016. Id. at ,i 7.
Ward continued to engage Mr. Roark as his attorney to defend him in a related criminal
matter then pending in Cassia County after the execution of the Agreement.

Following the

dismissal of the underlying lawsuit, Ward inquired "with my counsel, R. Keith Roark, whether it
would be possible to also have the criminal matter dismissed." Ward Deel. at

,r 8.

Mr. Roark

drafted and sent a letter dated January 9, 2017, to a deputy Cassia County Prosecutor in an effort
to resolve the criminal matter. Aff. of Gary D. Slette in Opp. to Def's. Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. B.
In the January 9 th letter, Mr. Roark notified the deputy prosecutor of the settlement in the
underlying lawsuit. Primera's claim for breach of the Agreement is based upon the January 9 th
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letter. Compl. at ,r 11. Ward maintains that he did not direct, authorize or review the letter prior
to Mr. Roark sending the letter.

LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Summary Judgment.

A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense, or the part
of each claim or defense on which summary judgment is sought. The court must grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56.
The nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of
material fact exists to establish a genuine issue." Northwest. Bee-Corp v. Home Living Serv., 136
Idaho 835, 838, 41 P.3d 263, 266 (2002). Accordingly, "[t]he moving party is entitled to
judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial." Lincoln Land Co., LLC v. LP Broadband, Inc., 163 Idaho 105, 408 P.3d 465, 468-69
(2017).
When the party moving for summary judgment will not carry the burden of production or
proof at trial, the "genuine issue of material fact" burden may be met by establishing the absence
of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. Once such
an absence of evidence has been established, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the
motion to establish, via further depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, that there is indeed
a genuine issue for trial, or to offer a valid justification for the failure to do so under I.R.C.P.
56(f). Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist., 125 Idaho 872,874,876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.1994).
When considering whether the evidence in the record shows that there is no
genuine issue of material fact, the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and
MEMORANDUM DECISION GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
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draw all reasonable inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party." Therefore, "[i]f
there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over
which this Court exercises free review" (citations omitted). Budget Truck Sales, LLC v. Tilley, 163 Idaho 841, 419 P .3d 1139, 1144 (2018).
B. Authority

The

three

types

of

agencies

are

express authority,

implied authority,

and

apparent authority. A principal creates agency when he:
(1) [E]xpressly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions on his or her
behalf; (2) impliedly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions which
are necessary to complete those actions that were expressly authorized; or (3)
apparently grants the agent authority to act through conduct towards a third party
indicating that express or implied authority has been granted.

Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Family Prop. Owners' Ass'n, Inc., 162 Idaho 317, 330, 396 P.3d

1199, 1212 (2017) (quotingHumphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728, 735, 366 P.3d 1088, 1095
(2016)); Fischer v. Croston, 163 Idaho 331,413 P.3d 731, 737-38 (2018).
C. Breach of Contract

"The elements for a claim for breach of contract are: (a) the existence of the contract, (b)
the breach of the contract, (c) the breach caused damages, and (d) the amount of those damages."
Mosel! Equities, LLC v. Berryhill & Co., 154 Idaho 269,278,297 P.3d 232,241 (2013); Path to
Health, LLP v. Long, 161 Idaho 50, 57,383 P.3d 1220, 1227 (2016).
DISCUSSION

The single question this Court is required to answer is: Did Mr. Roark have authority to
disclose the terms· of the Agreement in an attempt to settle the criminal matter? The parties do
not disagree that Mr. Roark was representing Ward as his attorney in the criminal proceeding at
the time the Agreement was disclosed to the deputy prosecutor. Pl' s Mem. in Opp. to Def' s Mot.
for Summ. J. ("Pl's Mem.") at 3; Defs Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Sumrn. J. at 4. ("Defs.
Mem."). The parties do not contend that Ward personally breached the terms of the Agreement.
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Def s. Reply Mern. in Supp. of Def s. Mot. for Surnm. J. at I. Liability can only attach to Ward
through a finding that his agent, Mr. Roark, had at least one of the three types of authority to act
recognized in Idaho law.
A. Express Authority

Express authority refers to that authority which the principal has explicitly granted the
agent to act in the principal's name. Muniz v. Schrader, 115 Idaho 497, 500, 767 P.2d 1272, 1275
(Ct.App.1989). Ward unequivocally states he neither authorized nor even knew that Mr. Roark
had intended to disclose the terms of his settlement with Primera to the Cassia County deputy
prosecutor. Ward Deel. at

,r,r

8-9. That statement has not been contradicted or rebutted by

anything in the record. In the absence of evidence regarding express authority which Primera
has the burden of proof at trial, there is, therefore, no genuine dispute of material fact as to Mr.
Roark lacking express authority from Ward to disclose the terms of the Agreement to a third
party.
B. Apparent Authority

Apparent authority differs from express and implied authority in that it is not based on
the words and conduct of the principal toward the agent, but on the principal' s words and
conduct toward the third party. Apparent authority may be found when a principal voluntarily
places an agent in such a position that a person of ordinary prudence, conversant with the
business usages and the nature of a particular business, is justified in believing that the agent is
acting pursuant to existing authority. Tri-Circle, Inc. v. Brugger Corp~, 121 Idaho 950, 955, 829
P .2d 540, 545 (Ct. App. 1992). "Consequently, apparent authority cannot arise from the acts and
statements of the agent alone; it must be based upon the principal's words and conduct." Landvik
by Landvik v. Herbert, 130 Idaho 54, 59, 936 P.2d 697, 702 (Ct.App.1997).
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Based upon the pleadings, motions, affidavits, declarations and exhibits on file in this
case there is an absence of evidence that Ward made any statement or that his conduct would
communicate to any party that Mr. Roark was authorized to disclose the prohibited Agreement
terms on his behalf. The mere fact that Mr. Roark was retained as Ward's attorney in both
matters does not, on its own, rise to the level of apparent authority to attribute the breach of the
confidential provisions of the Agreement to Ward. Ward could expect Mr. Roark to attempt to
settle the criminal matter and in fact he asked Mr. Roark if the criminal could be resolved. Ward
Deel. at

,r 8.

However, there is nothing in the record indicating that Ward authorized disclosure

of the barred provisions of the Agreement. In fact, Ward specifically states he did not "ask or
authorize [Mr. Roark] to disclose any of the terms of the settlement to the Prosecuting Attorney
for Cassia County" Id. Primera has not contradicted that sworn declaration by way of affidavit
or declaration. The doctrine of apparent authority is inapplicable to the facts as presented and
provides no basis for permitting Primera's claims of agency liability.
C. Implied Authority

Implied authority refers to that authority "which is necessary, usual, and proper to
accomplish or perform" the express authority delegated to the agent by the principal. Clark v.
Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10, 12,501 P.2d 278,280 (1972).
It is not disputed that Ward retained Mr. Roark to defend him in the criminal action.

Ward Deel. at

,r 8.

It is also not disputed that Ward did not give him the express authority to

divulge the confidentiality provisions of the Agreement. Id. Simply because Mr. Roark had been
retained and had express authority to represent Ward in the criminal proceedings cannot lead to
the legal conclusion that any action taken by Mr. Roark to settle that matter fell within the scope
of that express representation or that there was implied authority to take action that could lead to
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liability for Ward under the Agreement. Instead, Primera must prove that the disclosure of the
confidential terms of the Agreement was "necessary, usual, and proper" in the performance of
Mr. Roark's duties as Ward's criminal attorney, in order for an action to be maintained under the
theory of implied authority. The Court cannot make such a finding as there is an absence of
evidence that such action was necessary, usual, and proper.
Primera asserts that whether Mr. Roark was acting within his express or implied authority
is a question of fact. Pl's Mem. at 4. However, Primera fails to identify what evidence gives rise
to a question of fact on this issue. Ward states in his declaration that he did not authorize Mr.
Roark nor did he have any advanced knowledge that Mr. Roark intended to send a letter to the
deputy prosecutor disclosing the terms of the Agreement. Ward. Deel. at

,r,r 8 and

11. Primera

has not presented any facts to refute this declaration or to create a genuine issue of material fact
to explain or define the implied scope of Mr. Roark's authority as Ward's attorney in the
criminal proceeding.
As argued by Ward, "[i]f as Primera complains, the disclosure of the terms of the
Settlement Agreement was improper (i.e. a breach of the Agreement), then Mr. Roark's conduct
in allegedly doing so could not be 'necessary, usual, and proper."' Def s. Mem. at 7. The Court
cannot find that it was "necessary, usual, and proper" for Mr. Roark to disclose confidential
terms of a civil settlement agreement to diligently and fully represent the same client in a
separate criminal case after having been aware of and participated in the settlement negotiations,
which resolved the civil matter.
ORDER

Based on the foregoing, there is no genuine dispute that Ward personally breached the
terms of the Agreement. In addition, there is an absence of evidence and therefore no disputed
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fact that Ward never expressly authorized Mr. Roark to disclose the Agreement to a third party
nor are there any "words or conduct" by Ward that give rise to apparent authority for Mr.
Roark's actions.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that the disclosure of the confidential

portions of the Agreement were "necessary, usual, and proper" for the resolution of the criminal
case and that Mr. Roark had implied authority to divulge the confidential portions of the
Agreement. Finally, Primera has not produced additional material to establish a disputed issue of
material fact regarding the theories of agency. Therefore, Ward's motion for summary judgment
is GRANTED and it is unnecessary for the Court to rule as to liquid damages provision .

It is so ORDERED this

/(. \r-.

2U

day of July, 2018.

//;Y?/~
MICHAEL P. TRIBE
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

lo,

I hereby certify that on July
2018 I caused to be served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing document, by the method indicated below, to each of the following:

1. David T. Krueck
ELAM & BURKE, P.A.
251 E. Front Street, Suite 300
P.O. Box 1359
Boise, ID 83701

X

Email:

dtk@elamburke.com

2. Kimberly L. Williams

X

Email:

klwilliams@wmlattys.com

WILLIAMS, MES ER VY & LOTHSPEICH, LLP

153 E Main Street
P.O. Box 168
Jerome, ID 83338

Joseph W. Larsen
Clerk of the District Court
~ s s i a County, Idaho
By:

l,{_,~
Deputy Clerk
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Filed: 09/13/2018 16:48:28
Fifth Judicial District, Cassia County
Joseph W Larsen, Clerk of the Court
By: Deputy Clerk -Forthun, Theresa

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FU;TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CASSIA

PRIMERA BEEF, LLC, a Texas limited
Liability company,

Case No. CV-2017-290

Plaintiffs,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

vs.
ALLAN WARD, an individual
Defendant.

INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On July 20, 2018, the Court issued an opinion granting Defendant Allan Ward's
("Ward") motion for summary judgment. Mem. Decision Granting Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J.
("Court's Opinion") at 1-8. On August 21, 2018, Plaintiff Primera Beef, LLC ("Primera") filed a
motion for reconsideration along with a memorandum in support of the motion. On September
5, 2018, Ward filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion and on September 10, 2018,
Primera filed a reply memorandum. On September 12, 2018, the Court heard argument from
both parties and took the matter under advisement and deemed the issue fully submitted. For the
following reasons, Primera's motion is DENIED.

MEMORANDUM DECISION DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
CV-2017-290

Page 174

Page I

UNDISPUTED FACTS
Based on the pleadings, the Court adopts the undisputed facts recited in the Court's
Opinion on summary judgment for the purposes of the instant motion. Id. at 2-3.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Motion for Reconsideration

A motion for reconsideration is governed by I.R.C.P. l 1.2(b), which states: "A motion to
reconsider any order of the trial court entered before final judgment may be made at any time
prior to or within 14 days after the entry of a final judgment." A decision to grant or deny a
motion for reconsideration generally rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. Spur Prod.
Corp. v. Stoel Rives LLP, 142 Idaho 41, 49, 122 P.3d 300,308 (2005).

The Idaho Supreme Court has held on a motion for reconsideration that the trial court:
Must consider any new admissible evidence or authority bearing on the
correctness of an interlocutory order. However, a motion for reconsideration need
not be supported by any new evidence or authority. When deciding the motion for
reconsideration, the district court must apply the same standard of review that the
court applied when deciding the original order that is being
reconsidered ... [W]hen reviewing a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion
for reconsideration, this Court utilizes the same standard of review used by the
lower court in deciding the motion for reconsideration. If the decision was within
the trial court's discretion, we apply an abuse of discretion standard. On the other
hand, when reviewing the grant or denial of a motion for reconsideration
following the grant of summary judgment, this Court must determine whether the
evidence presented a genuine issue of material fact to defeat summary judgment.
Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (2012) (citations omitted).
B. Summary Judgment.

A party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense, or the part
of each claim or defense on which summary judgment is sought. The court must grant summary
judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 56.
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The nonmoving party must submit more than just conclusory assertions that an issue of
material fact exists to establish a genuine issue." Northwest. Bee-Corp v. Home Living Serv., 136
Idaho 835, 838, 41 P.3d 263, 266 (2002). Accordingly, "[t]he moving party is entitled to
judgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial." Lincoln Land Co., LLC v. LP Broadband, Inc., 163 Idaho 105, 408 P.3d 465, 468-69
(2017).
When the party moving for summary judgment will not carry the burden of production or
proof at trial, the "genuine issue of material fact" burden may be met by establishing the absence
of evidence on an element that the nonmoving party will be required to prove at trial. Once such
an absence of evidence has been established, the burden then shifts to the party opposing the
motion to establish, via further depositions, discovery responses or affidavits, that there is indeed
a genuine issue for trial, or to offer a valid justification for the failure to do so under I.R.C.P.
56(t). Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist., 125 Idaho 872, 874, 876 P.2d 154, 156 (Ct.App.1994).
When considering whether the evidence in the record shows that there is no
genuine issue of material fact, the trial court must liberally construe the facts, and
draw all reasonable inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party." Therefore, "[i]f
there is no genuine issue of material fact, only a question of law remains, over
which this Court exercises free review"
Budget Truck Sales, LLC v. Tilley, 163 Idaho 841, 419 P.3d 1139, 1144 (2018) (citations

omitted).
C. Authority

The

three

types

of

agencies

are

express authority,

implied authority,

and

apparent authority. A principal creates agency when he:
(1) [E]xpressly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions on his or her
behalf; (2) impliedly grants the agent authority to conduct certain actions which
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are necessary to complete those actions that were expressly authorized; or (3)
apparently grants the agent authority to act through conduct towards a third party
indicating that express or implied authority has been granted.
Forbush v. Sagecrest Multi Family Prop. Owners' Ass 'n, Inc., 162 Idaho 317, 330, 396 P.3d
1199, 1212 (2017) (quotingHumphries v. Becker, 159 Idaho 728, 735, 366 P.3d 1088, 1095
(2016)); Fischer v. Croston, 163 Idaho 331, 413 P.3d 731, 737-38 (2018)).
DISCUSSION
Primera does not present new facts or declarations for the Court to consider for the
instant motion, but cites additional case law not previously cited on summary judgment as well
as standard civil jury instructions.
There are three types of authority m an agency relationship: express, apparent, and
implied. See Forbush, 162 Idaho at 330, 396 P.3d at 1212. Primera, as nonmoving party on
summary judgment, bears the burden of demonstrating disputed issues of material fact under any
of the three types of authority to maintain an action of breach of a confidentiality term of a
settlement agreement against Ward for the actions of his attorney R. Keith Roark ("Roark").
Primera appears to argue strictly on an express authority theory, while Ward rebuts both the
express and implied theories. For the instant motion, neither Ward nor Primera made argument
on an apparent authority theory, thus the Court will only analyze express and implied authority.
Express authority refers to that authority which the principal has explicitly granted the
agent to act in the principal's name. Muniz v. Schrader, 115 Idaho 497,500, 767 P.2d 1272, 1275
(Ct.App.1989). Ward states he neither authorized nor even knew that Roark had intended to
disclose the terms of his settlement with Primera to the Cassia County deputy prosecutor. Ward
Deel. at ,r,r 8-9. That statement has not been contradicted or rebutted by anything in the record.
Primera appears to contend that it does not have to rebut Ward's declaration. In contrast,
Primera cites a case wherein an attorney failed to comply with court orders resulting in dismissal
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of the action. Devault v. Steven L. Herndon, A Pro.fl Ass'n, 107 Idaho 1, 2-3, 684 P.2d 978, 97980 (1984). That case is not analogous to the matter before the Court, as it is a case concerning a
rule violation where the penalties for noncompliance were contained in the rule, not a commonlaw agency case from which the theories actual or express authority arise. Primera also cites a
case where a realtor misrepresented the property boundary line. King v. H. J McNeel, Inc., 94
Idaho 444, 446, 489 P.2d 1324, 1326 (1971). By longstanding precedent a real estate agent's
representations of quality or productivity of land are not binding on a principal-seller, but
representations of boundary and quantity of land are "even though no express authority existed
giving the agent authority to make such representation." Id. McNeel does not appear to have
ever been cited outside of a real estate context. Furthermore, it is not analogous to the case
before the Court because the agent in that case was a dual agent in the transaction, employed
equally by both buyer and seller.
"Express actual authority derives from an act specifically mentioned to be done in a
written or oral communication." NLRB v. Dist. Council of Iron Workers of the State of Cal. &
Vicinity, 124 F .3d 1094, 1098 (9th Cir. 1997). In the absence of evidence regarding express

authority which Primera has the burden of proof at trial, there is no genuine dispute of material
fact that Roark lacked express authority from Ward to disclose the terms of the Settlement
Agreement to a third party. The weight of precedent does not permit the Court to allow to
proceed a claim on an express authority theory where the principal makes an uncontroverted
contention he made no specific, written or oral authorization of Roark violating the
confidentiality term of the Settlement Agreement. Ward Deel. at ,r,r 8-9.
"Implied actual authority comes from a general statement of what the agent is supposed
to do; an agent is said to have the implied authority to do acts consistent with that direction." Id.
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It is that authority "which is necessary, usual, and proper to accomplish or perform" the
express authority delegated to the agent by the principal. Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10, 12, 501
P .2d 278, 280 (1972).
Under this theory Ward could only be liable for the actions of Roark that were
"necessary, usual, and proper" to accomplish the task expressly authorized by Ward, which was
to represent him in the criminal matter. "Proper authority" implied to carry out an express
authority cannot be read as authority to do something improper in carrying out the express
authority-such as disclosing the confidential terms of an agreement-and therefore forecloses
liability imputed to Ward on the basis of an implied authority theory.
ORDER

Based on the foregoing, there is no genuine dispute no genuine dispute as to any material
fact under either a theory of express authority or implied authority and summary judgment is
proper. and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Therefore, Primera's motion
for reconsideration is DENIED.

It is so ORDERED this

_jJ_ day of September, 2018.
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